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We study the long run effects of a unique historical place-based policies targeting R&D: the
creation of “Science Cities” in former Soviet Russia. The establishment of Science Cities and
the criteria for selecting their location were largely guided by political and military-strategic
considerations. We compare current demographic and economic characteristics of Science
Cities to those of appropriately matched localities that were similar to them at the time of
their establishment. We find that in the modern Russian economy, despite the massive cuts
of governmental support to R&D that followed the dissolution of the USSR, Science Cities
host more high-skilled workers and more developed R&D and ICT sectors; are the origin of
more international patents; and generally appear to be more productive and economically
developed. Within a spatial equilibrium framework, we interpret these findings as the result
of the interaction between persistence and agglomeration forces. Furthermore, we rule out
alternative explanations that have to do with the differential use of public resources, and
we find limited support for a case of equilibrium reversion. Finally, by analyzing firm-level
data we obtain evidence in favor of spillover effects with a wide spatial breadth.
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1 Introduction
The effectiveness of public support to science and R&D is a longstanding issue in the
economics of innovation. Both direct subsidies and indirect incentives to research and
science are usually motivated on the existence of positive externalities (or other types
of market failures) which, in the absence of public intervention, cause underinvestment
in R&D. Some specific innovation policies, like the top-down creation of local R&D clus-
ters, are characterized by a geographical local dimension. In such contexts, assessing
the spatial extent of knowledge spillovers – one of the three forces of spatial agglomer-
ation first identified by Marshall (1890), corresponding with the “learning” effect from
the more recent classification by Duranton and Puga (2004) – is relevant for evaluating
the overall effect of the intervention. Moreover, the debate about localized innovation
policies mixes with the one about broader (that is, not innovation-specific) place-based
policies. In particular, it is argued whether place-based policies have any long-run ef-
fect, in the absence of which their net welfare effect is as likely to be negative as much as
positive (Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2008).1
This paper examines the long-run impact of a specific localized innovation policy:
the establishment of highly specialized “Science Cities” in the territory of modern Russia
during Soviet times. These are ninety-five middle-sized urban centers that were created
or developed by the Soviet government according to a grand-strategic plan of technolog-
ical advancement. Science Cities hosted a high concentration of R&D facilities – often
the only driving economic activity in town – typically built around a specific technolog-
ical purpose. Since Science Cities emerged in the context of technological and military
competition of the Cold War, most of them were, unsurprisingly, specialized in military-
applicable fields, such as nuclear physics, aerospace, ballistics and chemistry – although
a minority of them were focused in other areas. The above sectors remain, to this day,
those in which Russia maintains a comparative technological advantage.
1Their argument is based on the interaction between congestion effects and spatial agglomeration ex-
ternalities – such as those due to local knowledge spillovers – in a spatial equilibrium model that allows
for movement of workers across places. In their theoretical framework, place-based policies that move
employment between areas are welfare-improving only if they are effective at shifting economic activity
to a better long run equilibrium, one in which employment is reallocated in such a way that the increase in
self-reinforcing agglomeration forces more than countervails the possibly negative effects from increased
congestion. Multiple equilibria with such features are however only possible if agglomeration externalities
feature non-linearities. This has motivated subsequent empirical research aimed at uncovering agglom-
eration effects and their (potential) non-linearities. See also the discussion by Glaeser and Gottlieb (2009)
as well as that by Kline and Moretti (2014b).
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While one may question whether the institutional context of Russian Science Cities
is comparable to that of other industrialized countries, this historical experience stands
out with some unique features that motivate its analysis. First, the locations of Science
Cities were typically chosen by the Soviet leadership with criteria that are unusual for a
capitalistic market economy. According to historical research on the topic (Aguirrechu,
2009), since the Soviet government had the power to allocate both physical and human
capital where it deemed necessary, the potential for economic development and local
human capital accumulation was typically not, at the margin, a determinant of a loca-
tion’s choice for the establishment of a Science City. Instead, between any two places
that were similarly suited to host such a settlement, the choice usually fell over the one
that offered better secrecy and safety from foreign interference (in the form of R&D es-
pionage), or that satisfied other military and strategic criteria. This greatly diminishes
concerns for selection biases due to unobserved determinants of future development,
which typically affect studies about innovative clusters in other countries.
Second, the transition to a market economy that followed the dissolution of the USSR
resulted in a large negative shock for Russian R&D, as direct governmental expenditure
in R&D as a percentage of GDP fell by about 75%, causing half of the scientist and re-
searchers of post-1991 Russia to lose their job. Consequently, state support for Science
Cities was abruptly suspended; only recently it was partially resumed for fourteen of the
former towns, which today bear the official name of Naukogrady (“Science Cities” in
Russian). Together, these historical developments indicate that both the initiation and
discontinuation of the Science Cities program were largely driven by exogenous factors,
orthogonal to determinants of current demographic and economic conditions. In addi-
tion, by analyzing historical Science Cities separately from modern Naukogrady, we are
able to evaluate to what extent the modern characteristics of the former depend on long
run effects due to the Soviet-era policy, rather than on current governmental support.
We estimate the effect of the past establishment of a Science City on the following
set of present characteristics of Russian municipalities: human capital (measured as the
share of the population with either graduate or postgraduate qualifications), innovation
(evaluated in terms of patent output) and various proxies of economic development. In
order to give a causal interpretation to our estimates, we construct an appropriate con-
trol group by employing matching techniques. In particular, we match Science Cities to
other localities that, at the time of selection, were similar to them in terms of character-
istics that could affect both their probability of being chosen and their future outcomes.
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Our main identifying assumption is that, conditional on these variables, the choice of
a locality was determined at the margin by factors – such as potential for secrecy – that
would be independent from future, post-transition outcomes. In order to implement
this strategy we construct a unique dataset of Russian municipalities, which combines
both historical and more recently observed local characteristics.
Our results can be summarized as follows. In today’s Russia, Science Cities from the
Soviet era still host a more educated population, are more economically developed, em-
ploy a larger number of workers in R&D and ICT-related jobs, and produce more patents
than other localities that were comparable to them when the program started. Moreover,
researchers working in former Science Cities appear to be more productive, and to re-
ceive substantially higher salaries. The estimated treatment effect is typically lower than
the raw sample difference for all outcome variables except those related to patents, for
which no ex-ante bias can be attested. When we exclude modern Naukogrady from the
analysis our results remain largely unchanged, but the point estimates relative to total
and per capita patent production decrease by about 60%. In addition, through a more
in-depth analysis of our demographic outcomes and our night lights proxy for economic
development we find little evidence for reversion towards a symmetric equilibrium.
We interpret our results in light of a spatial equilibrium model à la Glaeser and Got-
tlieb (2009) and Moretti (2011). In the model, the Soviet Union initially allocates work-
ers of different skills in Science Cities and other localities; after the transition workers
are allowed to move. The model provides different predictions about several city-level
outcomes to the extent that Science Cities are inherently better places to live, workers’
mobility is more or less restricted, the initial allocation modified individual preferences
for location, or agglomeration forces such as knowledge spillovers exist. In light of these
predictions, we interpret our empirical results about the productivity and wages of high-
skilled workers as indicative of localized knowledge spillovers. This contrasts with the
recent analysis by von Ehrlich and Seidel (2015) of West German municipalities situated
along the Iron Curtain which used to be subsidized during the Cold War. Specifically,
they attribute their finding of positive long-run effects not on agglomeration forces, but
on the persistence of local infrastructural investment. Notably, we do not find evidence
favorable to a similar mechanism in our examination of Russian municipal budgets.
We also complement our municipality-level empirical analysis with an additional set
of estimates based on firm-level data. In particular, we employ data about Russian firms
from the fifth round of the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey
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(BEEPS V), which were sampled from regions where the majority of Science Cities are
located. Adopting a variety of specifications, we evaluate to what extent the distance of a
firm from a Science City correlates with its outcomes about innovation and productivity.
BEEPS V is particularly useful in this regard, as it features an innovation module with
detailed information about recent innovative activities by firms. This analysis is meant
to evaluate if, in the modern Russian economy, the effect of Science Cities spills over on
other firms that are located nearby, and to what economic and geographical extent. The
results reinforce our hypothesis that the the municipal-level differentials are at least in
part caused by knowledge spillovers, since firms are observed to be more R&D-intensive,
innovative and productive when locating relatively close to Science Cities.
Our paper contributes to various strands of the literature. First, we add to the set of
studies about the evaluation of place-based policies; for a recent survey of the empirical
research see Neumark and Simpson (2014). Most of these papers analyze policies en-
acted in the US (Neumark and Kolko, 2010; Busso et al., 2013; Kline and Moretti, 2014a)
or in the EU (Bronzini and de Blasio, 2006; Criscuolo et al., 2012; Givord et al., 2013; von
Ehrlich and Seidel, 2015). Among the few that focus, like us, on a non-western country,
there is a notable contribution by Wang (2013) about Chinese Special Economic Zones
(SEZs). The empirical challenges faced by these studies are typically about constructing
appropriate control groups, and disentangling direct effects from spillovers. Method-
ologically, our paper is most directly related to the study by Kline and Moretti (2014a)
on the Tennessee Valley Authority; like in their study, we apply a matching strategy in
order to uncover the long run consequences of our policy of interest. Unlike Kline and
Moretti, however, we find that these are not confined to the sector directly targeted by
the policy, arguably because of the effect of knowledge spillovers.
Second, and relatedly, we contribute to the more general search of agglomeration ef-
fects – and in particular of the third Marshallian force, localized knowledge spillovers – in
urban and regional economics. This has long been a traditional field of investigation for
economic geographers, with a particular interest in innovation clusters. Following sem-
inal contributions by Jaffe (1989), Glaeser et al. (1992), Audretsch and Feldman (1996)
and others, a large literature has developed.2 Recently, the issue has caught the attention
of economists working in more diverse fields. Moretti (2004) shows that in US cities, the
2We propose two fairly recent surveys: Beaudry and Schiffauerova (2009) focus on the “Marshall vs.
Jacobs” debate around the prevalence of, respectively, within- versus between-industry local knowledge
spillovers; while Boschma and Frenken (2011) devote special attention to studies within the evolutionary
economic geography research agenda.
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level of education of the workforce affects firm productivity across sectors. Ellison et al.
(2010) simultaneously test all three Marshallian theories by looking at the co-location
of plants across industries. Greenstone et al. (2010) demonstrate the existence of local
productivity spillovers following the opening of a “Million Dollar Plant.” In two separate
contributions, Bloom et al. (2013) and Lychagin et al. (2016) find an association between
firms’ R&D spending and the productivity of those nearby.3
The specific institutional setting of this paper relates it to other, somehow diverse
contributions about the consequences of historically massive forms of government in-
tervention on long-run economic and technological development, either in Russia or
elsewhere. Cheremukhin et al. (2017) argue that the “Big Push” industrialization policy
enacted in the USSR under Stalin did not succeed in shifting Russia onto a faster path of
economic development. Mikhailova (2012) evaluates negative welfare effects from the
regional demographic policies enacted by the Soviet Union. However, the picture looks
different in the more specific case of R&D policies. Through an analysis performed at
a higher level of geographic aggregation than ours, Ivanov (2016) finds that Russian re-
gions with more R&D personnel before the transition do better today at expanding em-
ployment in high-tech sectors. Outside Russia, Moretti et al. (2016) show that in OECD
countries increases in government-funded R&D for military purposes have positive net
effects on TFP, despite crowding out private expenditures in R&D.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces the history and char-
acteristics of Soviet Science Cities. Section 3 outlines the conceptual framework of the
paper. Section 4 describes the data employed in both the municipal-level and firm-level
analyses. Section 5 outlines our empirical methodologies. Sections 6 and 7 discuss the
empirical results, respectively for the municipal-level and the firm-level analyses. Fi-
nally, Section 8 recapitulates and concludes the paper.
2 Historical and Institutional Background
This section is divided in two parts. In the first part, we summarize the historical experi-
ence of Science Cities from Soviet times to modern Russia. In the second part we focus
in more detail on the selection criteria for the location of Science Cities.
3Other, related studies discuss to what extent patent citations can be exploited to recover patterns of
localized knowledge spillovers. See e.g. the seminal contribution by (Jaffe et al., 1993), the critical revision
of that original analysis by Thompson and Fox-Kean (2005), as well as the study by Breschi and Lissoni
(2009) which controls for co-authorship networks.
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2.1 History of Science Cities
The former Soviet Union was in a way a pioneer in public investment in science and
in place-based policies that focused on R&D. In the context of the Cold War competi-
tion between the USA and the USSR, the Soviet leadership prioritized the allocation of
the best resources – including human ones – to sectors considered vital to the country’s
national security. Around two-thirds of all Soviet R&D spending was set for military pur-
poses, and almost all of the country’s high-technology industry was in sectors directly
or indirectly related to defense (Cooper, 2012). Science Cities emerged in this environ-
ment. They were 95 middle-sized urban centers which the Soviet government endowed
with a high concentration of research and development facilities, and they were devoted
to a particular scientific and technical specialization.4 Science Cities began to develop
around strategically important (military) research centers from the mid-1930s;5 how-
ever, the majority of them were established after the Second World War, especially in the
1950s. See Table A.1 in the Data Appendix for more details about each Science City.
As they specialized in industries with high technological intensity, Science Cities
needed access to suitable equipment, machinery, intermediate inputs and qualified per-
sonnel. With the objective of co-locating scientific research centers, training institutes
and manufacturing facilities, the Soviet government established about two thirds of Sci-
ence Cities by “repurposing” existing settlements, while the rest were built from scratch
(Aguirrechu, 2009). For the sake of providing better incentives to individuals working in
Science Cities, the Soviet government strove to provide in these localities better living
conditions than the Soviet standard, by making available to residents a wider choice of
retail goods, more comfortable apartments as well as more abundant cultural oppor-
tunities than elsewhere in the country. Typically, the urban characteristics of Science
Cities were better than those of other contemporary settlements, as the former were de-
veloped according to the best urban planning criteria of the time (Aguirrechu, 2009).
Starting in the 1940s, with the need to protect the secrecy of the nuclear weapons
program in the Cold War environment (Cooper, 2012), many Soviet municipalities of
4The term “Science City” (Naukograd) was first introduced in 1991 (Ruchnov and Zaitseva, 2011). The
former Soviet Union was not a Science Cities pioneer — the first Science City was established in 1937 in
Peenemünde, Germany — but it has implemented the idea to a much larger extent.
5The model of innovation followed by the Soviet authorities since the early 1930s was the creation of
“special-regime enclaves intended to promote innovation” (Cooper, 2012). These enclaves first appeared
as secret research and development laboratories (so-called Experimental Design Bureaus or sharashki) in
the Soviet Gulag labor camp system. The scientists and engineers employed in a sharashka were prisoners
picked from various camps and prisons, and assigned to work on scientific and technological problems.
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military importance were “closed” to external access in order to maintain security and
privacy: non-residents needed an explicit permission in order to to travel to closed cities
and were subject to document checks and security checkpoints; relocating to a closed
city required a security clearance by the KGB; foreigners were prohibited from enter-
ing them at all; and dwellers had to keep their place of residence secret. Science Cities
whose main objective was to develop nuclear weapons, missile technology, aircraft and
electronics were closed as well; some of them were located in remote areas situated deep
in the Urals and Siberia – out of reach of enemy bombers – and were represented only
on classified maps. Note that the two sets of “Science Cities” and “closed cities” overlap
only partially, a fact that we take into account in our empirical analysis.
Following the dissolution of the USSR, Russia underwent a difficult transformation
from a planned to a market economy. The withdrawal of the state from many sectors of
the economy dramatically affected R&D as well. In Russia, gross R&D expenditures as
a fraction of GDP fell from the 1990 level of about 2% to a mere 0.74% in 1992.6 This is
even more dramatic in face of the fact that the Russian GDP shrank by about 50% in the
initial years of the transition. As a consequence of much lower wages, total employment
in R&D also fell by about 50%.7 This has inevitably affected Science Cities: while we lack
access to detailed information about governmental funding to them in the 1990s, anec-
dotal evidence speaks of an effective discontinuation of the military research programs
that Science Cities were responsible for, at least until the government, starting in the
early 2000s, re-established direct support for the 14 modern Naukogrady mentioned in
the introduction. Our analysis of municipal budgets of modern Russia (see Section 6),
confirms that Science Cities receive today, if anything, less governmental transfers than
comparable towns, especially if modern Naukogrady are removed from the count.
2.2 Location of Science Cities
Given the nature of the period during which most Science Cities were established and
the associated political context, any systematic, reliable and transparent information on
6We calculated these figures using as sources: Gokhberg (1997), the Russian Statistical Yearbooks for
various years, and the OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators (MSTI) database.
7Whereas in Soviet times the wages of scientists were 10-20% higher than average, they dropped to 65%
of the average wage already in 1992 following the withdrawal of the state from the R&D sector (Saltykov,
1997). Even worse, during the 1990s many scientists did not even receive their salary, or received only a
fraction of it (sometimes in kind) over extended periods (Ganguli, 2014). Low remuneration was not the
only reason for researchers to leave the R&D sector: with the removal of previous restrictions to individual
mobility, scientists were allowed to migrate abroad.
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how their locations were chosen does not exist. Thanks to the cited historical research
by Aguirrechu (2009), however, it is possible to identify some general factors that drove
the choice of locations for specific groups of Science Cities. Two general themes emerge
from our reading of Aguirrechu’s work. First, the relevant natural, socio-economic and
demographic factors that influenced the choice of a place usually varied by the specific
function of a Science City. Second, at the margin the choice of a location over another
usually depended on political, military and security motivations that are arguably unre-
lated with the determinants of economic outcomes in a typical market economy. These
two considerations, on which we expand below, inform the empirical strategy of this
paper. Specifically, our matching strategy rests on the assumption that controlling for
certain relevant factors, Science City status is unrelated to current outcomes.
In terms of socio-economic and demographic characteristics that affected the loca-
tion of Science Cities, the most relevant one that is identified by Aguirrechu is, unsur-
prisingly, the pre-existing level of economic and social development. Figure 1 depicts
the location of Science Cities superimposed on the chloropleth map of Russian regions
distinguished by population density. With some exceptions, Science Cities were estab-
lished in the areas of Russia that were the most industrialized, urbanized, and with a
better educated population, so that they could have easier access to qualified personnel
or be able to attract it with minor additional costs. For this reason, arguably, Science
Cities are also for the most part located in the western, warmer part of Russia, within the
humid continental climatic region typified by large seasonal temperature differences.
Historically, in fact, the socio-economic development differentials between Russian re-
gions strongly correlates with temperature gradients along a longitudinal axis.8
Other geographical factors differ by type of Science City. Those engaging primarily in
basic R&D were typically semi-isolated, to be found either in outer parts of a region or in
the territories between major highways and railroads. Science Cities engaging primar-
ily in applied, production-oriented R&D in civil- or double-purpose industries (such as
electronics or aviation), by contrast, were located either close to the regional capital or
in the proximity of transportation links: with a very Marshallian motivation, these cities
were in more need of easy access to both upstream suppliers and downstream “buyers”
(a term to be interpreted in the context of a socialist economy). Heavy industry and
nuclear technology needed large amounts of water, therefore Science Cities specialized
8In Russia, temperature changes more along the west-east axis, than along the north-south axis; thus,
for two localities with the same latitude, the eastern one is typically colder.
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in those areas were typically built close to rivers or lakes. For analogous reasons, those
Science Cities focused in military shipbuilding clearly had to be located on the coast.
The exact location of Science Cities, however, often depended on very idiosyncratic
factors whose main motivation was military, political or strategic. In general, Aguirrechu
underlines the fact that, whenever a Science City had to be set in an urbanized and rel-
atively developed region, between any two similar localities the choice usually fell on
that with the most potential to maintain secrecy and minimize the threat of spying; he
supports this argument with anecdotal evidence. In this respect, it is not surprising that
many Science Cities were established in the proximity of Moscow, close to the central
government and the headquarters of security agencies such as the KGB. At the extreme,
considerations of this kind overrode all the others. In particular, Science Cities special-
izing in some applied R&D fields such as the production of nuclear and strategic arms
faced a much higher threat of bombing and spying; and were located in regions far from
the borders and in municipalities far from the regional center (with limited transport
links) and previously poorly populated. Examples include Sarov and Snezhinsk.9
Some of these idiosyncratic factors depended on other historical and political cir-
cumstances. Following the evacuation of factories from the European part of the Soviet
Union beyond the Urals during the Second World War, those areas developed rapidly.
On the one hand, this may explain the concentration of many Science Cities in the Urals
area. On the other hand, this was a historical driver for the establishment of a particu-
lar class of Science Cities, the so-called “academic towns” (akademgorodki), in Siberian
centers to the East of the Urals with rising industrial and strategic importance but lim-
ited scientific capacities. Academic towns were semi-isolated neighborhoods of a larger
city, endowed with R&D facilities, housing for R&D staff and their families, as well as ba-
sic local infrastructure; the research in natural sciences that was conducted in academic
towns was directly linked to the specific issues faced by Siberia (Aguirrechu, 2009).
9These two places provide a particularly indicative example of idiosyncratic factors affecting the loca-
tion of Science Cities: sometimes, this was determined by the presence of other Science Cities, or lack
thereof. Specifically, Snezhinsk (located in the Chelyabinsk region) was established as a double of Sarov
(in the Nizhny Novgorod region) with the main purpose of keeping the industry working even if one of the
two places were destroyed, but also to create inter-City competition. Since Sarov is located in a relatively
remote location in the European part of Russia, Snezhinsk hat to be placed in a similarly out-of-reach
area, but to the East of Urals. Officials reportedly considered other locations in different regions, but ul-
timately decided on Snezhinsk because of its proximity to another Science City, Ozyorsk, which could
supply inputs to Snezhinsk. A similar pattern of interplay between decisions affecting different Science
Cities was not unique; for example, the four places specialized in the production of enriched uranium
were also located far from each other.
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3 Analytical Framework
We interpret the long-run effect of the establishment of Science Cities in light of a spatial
equilibrium framework typical of the Urban Economics literature. Specifically, we adapt
the model by Moretti (2011, 2013) which itself extends Rosen (1979), Roback (1982) and
Glaeser and Gottlieb (2008, 2009). This adaptation is designed to correspond with our
empirical strategy: in the model, we describe two ex-ante identical cities, one of which
became a Science Cities, and we analyze the spatial equilibrium that would emerge in
a market economy. We focus our discussion on the economic mechanisms that could
endogenously explain the post-transition differences between the two cities for selected
outcomes of interest. In what follows, we sequentially describe the setup of the model
and the post-transition spatial equilibrium.
3.1 Model Setup
Consider two ex-ante identical cities, s and z, which could be inhabited by different
types of workers: those of high educational level or “skill,” and those of relatively lower
skill. This dichotomous classification is typically interpreted in terms of differences in
higher educational achievement. In this context, high-skilled workers can be more nar-
rowly identified as researchers engaged in R&D, with low-skilled workers residually rep-
resenting all other individuals (including university-educated) who are employable in
all other sectors. The model is general enough to allow for both interpretations. Here we
denote the logarithm of the mass of high-skilled workers employed in city c at time t as
hct , while `ct is the corresponding notation for low-skilled workers.
At time t = 0 the two cities are part of the Soviet Union which, for exogenous reasons,
attributes to s (but not to z) the status of Science City. As a consequence of this, the gov-
ernment allocated proportionately more high-skilled workers to s, so that (hs0−hz0)> 0.
At the same time, since in the Soviet Union economic activity was highly segregated geo-
graphically, this implies (`s0−`z0)≤ 0. A final consequence of Science City status is that
the urban planning choices and the public investments associated with the policy might
have made Science Cities a more enjoyable location to live in. In Urban Economics par-
lance one would say, then, that the amenities as of Science City s are higher than the
amenities az of the ordinary locality z: hence a˜ ≡ as −az ≥ 0.
At time t = 1 the two cities are part of modern Russia, a market economy, and workers
of both types self-select into either location. Following Moretti (2011, 2013) we express
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the logarithmic indirect utility uni c of an individual i of type n = h,`, obtained from
living in city c = s, z, as:
uni c =wnc − rc +ac +eni c (1)
where wnc is the log-wage earned by workers of type n in city c, rc is an index of local
prices (such as housing rents), while eni c denotes the idiosyncratic taste of individual
i for city c. For simplicity, here we assume that local prices are identical in the two lo-
cations, that is rz = rs . If rc represents rents, this could follow if houses are supplied
completely elastically in two competitive markets employing the same technology. In
fact, we also abstract from congestion effects à la Glaeser and Gottlieb (2008, 2009) and
any kind of negative externalities that may depend on a city’s population. This allows to
focus our discussion on the interplay between labor supply and agglomeration effects.
We model the relative preferences of individuals for the two localities as follows:
eni s −eni z ∼U [−mn +bn ,mn +bn] (2)
here, for both types n = h,`, mn represents the overall degree of mobility of workers of
type n – intuitively, the higher mn the lower the importance of idiosyncratic tastes for
the choice of location – while bn is the type-specific average bias towards Science City s.
In Moretti (2011, 2013) it is maintained that bh = b` = 0, however here we assume that:10
bh = b (hs0−hz0)> 0
b` = b (`z0−`s0)≤ 0
(3)
where b (·) is an increasing monotone function with b (0)= 0. This hypothesis introduces
a mechanism of path-persistence: if an individual used to reside in a specific city during
Soviet times, she is likely to prefer to stick there. Consequently, the average bias of work-
ers of a given type depends on their relative allocation at t = 0. Another interpretation
of (3) is in terms of restrictions to mobility: in Russia, internal mobility used to be very
costly if not altogether impossible, due to regulation inherited from Soviet times.11 This
can be represented as a differential, between the two groups, in the average moving cost.
10A careful reader will have noted that allowing bh ,b` 6= 0 is omothetic to letting the value of amenities
vary by worker type, as in Moretti. We feel that in this institutional context, it is important – for the sake of
interpreting the empirical evidence – to make a mechanism of path-persistence in location choice explicit
in our conceptual framework.
11A system of internal visas was in place until the early 2000s. Studies about internal migration rates in
Russia in the 1990s show that they were very low (Andrienko and Guriev, 2004; Friebel and Guriev, 2005).
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Finally, to close the model we introduce two types of firms: those that employ skilled
labor, and those who rely on workers of the low type instead. While in Moretti’s analy-
sis this was largely a simplification meant to abstract from the degree of substitutability
between skills, this characteristic of the model can be given here a contextual interpreta-
tion: if workers of type h are researchers, type-h firms correspond with the R&D sector,
while type-` firms represent the rest of the local economy. The log-output ync of type-n
firms in city c is determined according to a Cobb-Douglas technology:
yhc = xhc +θhhc +µhc +
(
1−µ)khc
y`c = x`c +θ`hc +µ`c +
(
1−µ)k`c (4)
where xnc is the city- and type-specific total factor productivity, while knc is the log-
capital employed by the firms of type n in city c. The supply of capital is infinitely elastic
and its cost is the same for all firms in the two cities s and z. For simplicity, the elasticity
of labor is equal to µ ∈ (0,1) for both types of firms in both cities. Note that firms of type
` do not hire workers of type h, but take hc as given.
The interpretation of parameters θh ≥ 0 and θ` ≥ 0 is as follows. For type-h firms,
θh > 0 allows for increasing returns due to knowledge spillovers: since the productivity of
high-skilled workers grows more than proportionately to their number, this introduces
an agglomeration force in the economy. Note that θh = 0 implies constant returns to
scale in type-h firms. If knowledge spillovers also operate between firms, and the size of
the local skilled workforce can affect the productivity of the less skilled workers as well,
then θ` > 0. Such a distinction between “restricted” and “general” spillover effects is, to
the best of our knowledge, new in theoretical frameworks of urban economics. We find
it worthwhile to introduce it, since the model provides different equilibrium predictions
to the extent that θh > 0, θ` > 0, or both – with corresponding empirical implications.
3.2 Spatial Equilibrium
We now turn to the description of the t = 1 equilibrium. In a spatial equilibrium, some
marginal worker of either type must be indifferent between cities s and z. This implies
that the supply of, say, high-skilled labor in either city is determined by the following






=whs −whz + a˜+bh (5)
12
where h ≡ hs +hz is given and such that h < θ−1h µmh .12 The equilibrium wage differ-
entials (whs −whz) are obtained as the difference between the marginal productivity of
high-skilled labor in the two cities; this difference, in turn, depends on the equilibrium
in the capital market.13 A symmetric analysis applies to the case of low-skilled labor.
As a result, the relative difference in equilibrium high-skilled employment between








where x˜h ≡ xhs − xhz is the difference in log-TFP of type-h firms between the two cities.
Equation (6) is interpreted as follows: there are three forces that cause Science Cities to
continue hosting a larger number of researchers and high-skilled workers after the tran-
sition. These are: i. inherent productivity differentials (x˜h > 0), ii. superior amenities in
Science Cities (a˜ > 0), and iii. path-dependence mechanisms (bh > 0). All these forces
are stronger the more high-skilled workers are mobile (lower mh) and the larger are the
agglomeration effects (larger θh). Importantly, agglomeration effects alone are not suffi-
cient to cause employment differentials, at least in the equilibrium under analysis: they
only complement those factors (i.-iii.) that affect the supply of labor.
The relative difference in the productivity of high-skilled workers equals that of their
wages: (
yhs − yhz
)− (hs −hz)= (whs −whz)= mh x˜h +θhh (a˜+bh)
µmh −θhh
(7)
this result bears some important implications for our empirical analysis. First, absent
agglomeration forces (θh = 0) these differences are proportional to the log-TFP differen-
tials x˜h . Second, if the latter are null (x˜h = 0) any positive difference in the productivity
and wages of high-skilled workers between Science Cities and comparable locations is
indicative of increasing returns.14 In our empirical analysis we measure the difference
12This condition is necessary to avoid that the denominators of (6) and (7) turn negative, breaking their
interpretability. In practice, spillovers θh and the total mass of log-researchers h cannot be simultaneously
“too high,” or the equilibrium would degenerate into full spatial concentration of high-skilled workers.
13Equilibrium in the capital market implies that the marginal productivity of capital must be equal in
the two cities: (khs −khz ) = (hs −hz )+µ−1x˜h . This lets express the difference between the inverse labor
demands in the two cities as: (whs −whz )=µ−1 [x˜h +θh (hs −hz )].
14Intuitively, under constant returns to scale (θh = 0) the endogenous response of capital would equalize
differences across the two cities in both the marginal and the average product of (high-skilled) labor, even
in presence of employment differentials.
13
in municipal-level outcomes, observed about 20 years following the dissolution of the
USSR, between several dozens of Science Cities and their matched counterparts. Thus,
by standard statistical arguments it is unlikely that exogenous shocks to TFP alone could
explain any systematic productivity or wage differentials for high-skilled workers.
For low-skilled workers, the equilibrium log-employment difference reads (for given









and its sign is undetermined. In fact, path-persistence mechanisms that may push low-
skilled workers away from Science Cities (b` ≤ 0) could be more than compensated by:
amenity differentials (a˜ ≥ 0), TFP differentials (x˜` ≡ x`s − x`z ≥ 0), and, if Science Cities
host more high-skilled workers, cross-sector agglomeration forces (θ` (hs −hz)≥ 0). The
equilibrium differentials in productivity and wages for low-skilled workers are:
(
y`s − y`z
)− (`s −`z)= (w`s −w`z)= x˜`+θ` (hs −hz)
µ
(9)
hence, by a reasoning analogous to the one outlined in the case of high-skilled workers,
any empirical difference in those variables – in sectors unrelated to R&D – is evidence
favorable to the operation of “generalized” spillover effects (θ` > 0).
All these results would still hold, in qualitative terms, if rents or congestion effects
were allowed to vary by city and to depend on a city’s total population. In this case real
wage differentials would be smaller than nominal wage differentials, thereby restraining
labor mobility in equilibrium. See Moretti (2011, 2013) for a full-fledged analysis of this
model with negative locational externalities but without positive agglomeration forces.
4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We evaluate the long-run effects of Science Cities by employing a unique dataset, which
contains information previously unavailable in electronic format. Specifically, it com-
bines: i. our database on Science Cities, which is described in Section 2 and reported
in the Data Appendix; ii. municipal-level data that aggregate various sources about his-
torical and current characteristics of Russian cities; and iii. a firm-level database that is
obtained by merging BEEPS V Russia and Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis data. In what follows,
we separately detail on the latter two.
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4.1 Municipal-level Data Sources and Construction
We construct a municipal-level dataset for all Russian municipalities (2333 in total).15
We obtain administrative data from official sources, and we merge municipalities to dif-
ferent types of information through GIS softwares. We manually assign Science City
status to each municipality; in total the data include 88 municipalities with at least one
Science City.16 In a few cases historical and current municipal boundaries do not match
exactly, thus we clean our data manually. Data types and sources are described in more
detail in the Data Appendix; here we briefly summarize them by distinguishing – for the
sake of clarity – between current socio-economic outcomes, data about recent munici-
pal budgets, geographical characteristics and historical variables.
CurrentOutcomes. Our variables of interest about current characteristics of Russian
municipalities match the main outcomes of interest from our theoretical framework.
Specifically, we extract data about the overall municipal population, the share of the
population that attained higher education qualifications, and the share of the popula-
tion that completed any form of postgraduate education from the 2010 Russian Census.
We proxy innovation by the total count of local inventor addresses that appear on
patents applied to the European Patent Office (EPO) between 2006 and 2015. Each ad-
dress is weighted by the inverse of the number of inventors that appear on the relevant
patent; we call this measure (local) fractional patents. We also divide this measure by
the total number of a city’s inhabitants holding a postgraduate qualification, so to ob-
tain a proxy for average researchers’ productivity. In addition, we examine information
about total employment and per-capita wages in the combined R&D-ICT sectors; this is
obtained from the Russian Statistical Office (ROSSTAT). Note that ROSSTAT data of any
kind are typically never available for closed cities, arguably because of considerations of
Russian national security.
Finally, as accurate GDP data at the municipal level is unavailable in Russia, we use
several proxies for economic activity: average night lights intensity observed by satellites
15In this paper, we use the English term “municipality” to denote the municipal’nye obrazovaniya of
Russia, i.e. units at the second administrative level (akin to U.S. counties). We use the word “region” to
refer instead to federal subjects (oblast’, kray or respublika) i.e. units at the first administrative level.
16NAS (2002) lists four Science Cities for which only their Soviet-era nomenclature is publicly available:
Krasnodar-59, Novosibirsk-49, Omsk-5 and Perm-6. Their exact location is still unclear; thus we exclude
these four places from the analysis as they cannot be matched to any municipality. In addition, three pairs
of Science Cities are located within the same municipalities. Hence, 91 Science Cities are mapped to 88
municipalities with at least one Science City.
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in 1992-1994 and in 2009-2011,17 as well as a number of variables concerning local Small
and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) from the 2010 SME census by ROSSTAT. In particular,
we examine the overall number, the density and the labor productivity of SMEs, either
across all sectors of the economy or specifically in manufacturing.
Municipal Budgets. Similarly as von Ehrlich and Seidel (2015), we also analyze in-
formation about the budgets of Russian municipalities, which can be accessed through
ROSSTAT for 2006-2016. On the revenue side, we are able to differentiate between direct
revenues (e.g. from local taxes) and transfers from both the federal and regional govern-
ments. In addition, we are able to distinguish local expenditures by category, such as
education, healthcare, local infrastracture, et cetera. All measures are converted to 2010
prices using ROSSTAT’s official CPI indices.
Geographical Characteristics. We collect or calculate municipal-specific informa-
tion about several geographical characteristics: municipal area, average altitude, as well
as and average temperatures in January and July. Since locating close to large amounts
of water was necessary for Science Cities of certain specializations, we also collect data
on each municipality’s access to the coast, to a major river or to a major lake.18
Historical Variables. For the sake of matching Science Cities to other municipalities
that were similar to them at beginning of the Cold War, we collect a number of historical
information about Russian municipalities. To account for differences in city size we use
population data from the first post-World War II census held in the Soviet Union, which
was conducted in January 1959.19 Since the 1959 census does not break population data
by educational achievement at the municipal level, we use data on the number of higher
education institutions located in a municipality in 1959 (De Witt, 1961), as well as that
on the number of local R&D institutes in 1947 (Dexter and Rodionov, 2016), in order to
proxy for the pre-existing human capital of an urban area.
To control for the existing level of industrial development in a municipality, we use
17Night lights can plausibly be used as a proxy for economic activity under the assumption that lighting
is a normal good; see Donaldson and Storeygard (2016). Examples of economic studies employing night
lights as a proxy for economic activity within geographic units for which no alternative data source is
available include Hodler and Raschky (2014) and Storeygard (2016).
18For each municipality, we code this information both as dummy variables (presence or absence of
either fresh or salted water within the municipal territory) and as the distance between the municipality’s
geographical centroid and the closest source of water in question.
19We would prefer to use population data from the 1940s but there was no census conducted until 1959;
moreover, World War II affected the Russian demography so much that any figures collected before 1941
are inadequate.
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two pieces of information. The first is the number of plants of the Soviet defense indus-
try (factories, research and design establishments) which are located in each municipal-
ity in 1947 (Dexter and Rodionov, 2016). The second is the number of local branches of
the State Bank of the USSR in 1946, obtained from the archives of the Bank itself: this
institution was an instrument of the Soviet economic policy, and the geographical dis-
persion of its branches can be seen as indicative of an area’s importance for the Soviet
developmental strategies; see also Bircan and De Haas (2017). Moreover, most Science
Cities needed access to good transportation links, while others had to be located in re-
mote areas far from espionage threats. To account for both factors we use GIS data about
Russian railroads in 194320 and about the post-WWII USSR borders.21
Summary Statistics. Table 1 displays summary statistics for municipal-level char-
acteristics and outcomes, distinguishing between municipalities hosting Science Cities
and all other ordinary municipalities. It shows that, on average, Science Cities were lo-
cated in more populous and warmer places, with a higher historical concentration of
industrial plants, universities, and R&D institutes. In addition, all our current outcome
variables register positive and significant differences.
4.2 Firm-level Data Sources
To perform our firm-level analysis, we use the fifth round of BEEPS merged with Bureau
van Dijk’s Orbis database – both for Russia only. BEEPS is a firm-level survey conducted
by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank. It is
based on face-to-face interviews with 4,220 managers of registered firms with at least
five employees.22 Stratified random sampling is used to select eligible firms to partici-
pate in the survey. While the survey was limited to a subset of all the Russian regions,
those that were chosen encompass the majority of historical Science Cities, as shown in
Figure 2. The database contains geographic coordinates of the firm’s location, based on
which we can determine distances from Science Cities.
20In the Soviet economy, railroads were the workhorse of the transportation network; road transport
played only a secondary role (Ambler et al., 1985). Most of the railroads’ construction took place in tsarist
Russia; even in Soviet times railroads were not important just for transportation and mobility, but also as
drivers of regional industrialization. Using information about the railroad network in 1943 is preferable to
later dates, because the Soviet rail transport became one of the most developed in the world after World
War II, driven by the country’s need to extract – and transport – its natural resources.
21Similarly as with the water-related variables, we record information related to historical railroads or
the USSR borders both as dummies and as distances from the municipal centroid.
22The main objective of BEEPS is the assessment of the business environment across different regions.
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Outcomes. BEEPS V included, for the first time, an innovation module. This provides
information as to whether, in the last three years prior to the survey a firm engaged in
in-house or outsorced R&D; if it introduced a new product, process or technological
innovation, and whether it was granted any patent. We manually clean the information
contained in the innovation module: for each firm, we verify whether survey responses
match the firm’s main product and industry, by also employing external information
about the individual firms.23 Moreover, we are able to match about 75% of BEEPS firms
to Orbis accounting data, which gives us access to additional measures of economic
performance (labor productivity and operating revenue) for a subset of firms.
Controls. BEEPS V Russia contains measures for several firm characteristics, such
as: age; industry; exporter status; ownership; geographical scope of the main market
(regional, national or international); exporter status (direct or indirect); the number of
permanent full-time employees; the share of employees with a university degree. In ad-
dition, geographic coordinates let us control for the size of the city where firms operate.
Summary Statistics. Table 2 reports descriptive statistics at the firm level. Notably, a
sizable fraction of firms (21.6%) reports at least some type of innovation in the last three
years prior to the survey; however the fraction of firms performing R&D is lower (11.1%).
About one third of the firms in our sample are in manufacturing. The closest Science
City for our firms is, on average, distant 154km; not much in the Russian landscape.
5 Empirical Methodology
In this section we outline our two empirical strategies for, respectively, our municipal-
level and our firm-level analyses. In what follows, we discuss them both separately.
5.1 Municipal-level Analysis
We compare the long-run outcomes Ycq of municipalities hosting Science Cities against
those of other municipalities (that we call “ordinary” municipalities) that in the years
following World War II were similar to Science Cities in terms of geographical and socio-
economic characteristics Xck . Here c = 1, . . . , N indexes municipalities; q = 1, . . . ,Q our
23We also compare the descriptions of the main new product or process reported in the survey with the
definitions given in the Oslo Manual (OECD and Statistical Office of the European Communities, 2005),
removing those that do not match.
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long-run outcomes of interest; and k = 1, . . . ,K the geographical and historical charac-
teristics we control for. For each long-run outcome, we estimate the Average Treatment
Effect on the Treated (ATT) as in a standard program evaluation framework, with the
treatment being the historical establishment of a Science City in a municipality.
Our identifying assumption is that, conditional on the observed geographical and
historical characteristics, the establishment of Science cities did not depend on fac-
tors that would affect future outcomes. The rationale of the Conditional Independence
Assumption is provided here by our previous discussion about the location of Science
Cities. In particular, we consider those military, strategic and generally idiosyncratic fac-
tors that typically affected the choice of Soviet planners as unobservables, orthogonal to
current outcomes. Similarly, the choice of observable characteristics we match upon is
also based on the historical evidence discussed in Section 2: we control for the level of
economic development, human capital, accessibility and the presence of certain natural
features using the historical data that we assembled. Importantly, we also account for
“closed city” status: we match Science Cities that were closed to ordinary municipalities
that were also closed, and symmetrically for non-closed cities.
Our matching algorithm of choice is Mahalanobis matching, by which a Science City
s is matched to the ordinary municipality z with the lowest Mahalanobis Distance msz :
msz (xs ,xz)= (xs −xz)TΣ (xs −xz) (10)
where xc is the vector of all observable covariates for municipality c = s, z; while Σ is the
empirical covariance matrix of the covariates. Matching is performed with replacement,
so that a control municipality can be linked up to multiple treated cities; in addition, it
is conditional upon exact matching on certain dummy variables, that is access to inland
water, coastal city status and closed city status. With respect to other typical matching
methods, such as Propensity Score Matching (PSM), we feel that Mahalanobis matching
allows to better handle the geographical dimension of this setting. In fact, we include
municipal coordinates into vector xc , requiring that Science Cities are matched to places
close in space, so to mitigate concerns about the effect of area-specific unobservables.
We also replicate our analysis using PSM, which produces ATT estimates that are usually
slightly larger than in the Mahalanobis case (they are available upon request).24
24Relative to PSM, however, Mahalanobis matching has its own drawbacks: it is known to perform worse
with a high number of covariates, or when covariates are not normally distributed (Gu and Rosenbaum,
1993; Zhao, 2004). In order to improve on the quality of matching, we calculate Mahalanobis distances
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Our sample of treated observations varies across different ATT estimates, for two
reasons: first, specific information for certain municipalities – like closed cities – is not
publicly available; second, we perform robustness checks such as the removal of mod-
ern Naukogrady from the analysis. For each subsample we replicate our matching algo-
rithm, and obtain different sets of treated-control matches.25 For all our outcomes we
estimate the ATT with and without the correction for the multiple covariates bias, and
we perform statistical inference by calculating standard errors based on conventional
formulae (Abadie and Imbens, 2006, 2011). Since our coverage of Russian municipali-
ties equals or approximates the universe we do not apply sampling weights.
5.2 Firm-level Analysis









[−λ ·dist( f , s)]Hs︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡G f r=G f r (H1,...,HS ;λ)
+ηr +ε f r (11)
where f = 1, . . . ,F indexes firms; s = 1, . . . ,S denotes Science Cities; r is a subscript for
Russian regions; I∗f r is the latent variable associated with one specific innovation bi-




is the geodesic distance between firm f and Science City
s;
(
W f r,1, . . . ,W f r,D
)
are D controls available in the data (see Section 4); Hs is some rele-
vant characteristic of Science City s; ηr is a region fixed effect; and finally ε f r is an error
term which is distributed as a standard normal. In addition, we estimate via OLS a linear
version of (11):
logP f r = β˜0+
D∑
d=1
β˜d W f r,d + γ˜G f r + η˜r +υ f r (12)
where P f r is either the firm’s operating revenue (sales), or labor productivity. Functional
forms that involve a term akin to G f r are routinely adopted in studies of R&D spillovers
(Lychagin et al., 2016) or of agglomeration effects between firms (Drucker, 2012).
using the logs of covariates with highly asymmetric empirical distributions. In the case of covariates Xck
that can take zero values (such as the historical number of plants, universities or R&D institutes) we use
the corresponding quantity xck = log(Xck +1).
25The differences are due to the removal of certain ordinary municipalities, such as closed ones, from
the raw sample on which matching is performed. However, we find these differences negligible.
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In probit regressions, the main parameter of interest is γ, which measures the rela-
tionship between the innovation of firm f and the characteristics Hs of all Science Cities
s, weighted by the relative geographic proximity between f and each s. To more easily
interpret the empirical model, observe that exp
[−λ ·dist( f , s)] is the exponential decay
of a Science City’s “influence” in space: it is equal to 1 if a firm locates right in the center
of a Science City, and it is negligible unless firm f and city s are relatively close. Thus, if
a firm is located in a relatively isolated Science City, the quantity γ · φˆ f – where φˆ f is the
standard normal density function evaluated at the parameter estimates and at firm f ’s
values of the RHS variables – approximates the marginal effect of the characteristics Hs
of Science City s on the probability of a positive realization of I f r for firm f . Similarly, in
linear models γ˜ is more easily interpreted as the average change in P f r for firms that are
located in a “relatively isolated” Science City with characteristics Hs .
These specifications are flexible, and vary with the choice of Hs and parameterλ. For
both linear and non-linear models, we analyze the dependence of our outcomes of inter-
est with different “agglomeration measures” based on three alternative characteristics
Hs of a Science City that likely relate to its innovation potential. These are: the fractional
patents produced in Science City s, the graduate share of its population, and its post-
graduate share. Descriptive statistics and cross-correlations for the resulting firm-level
agglomeration measures G f r are displayed in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. We analyze
each measure in isolation, or by including all three in the same regression; in addition,
in some specifications we interact G f r with a manufacturing/services dummy in order
to evaluate whether parameter γ (or γ˜) varies by macro-sector. In our main empirical
analysis we set λ = 1; however, we obtain similar results with higher values for this pa-
rameter (results obtained when setting λ= 2 or λ= 5 are available upon request).
While we do not attempt to give any causal interpretation to our firm-level results, we
observe that the concerns of endogeneity are limited in this setting. Since the creation
of Science Cities predates the establishment of most modern Russian firms – virtually
all in our sample – the only way for the distance-based regressor and the error term to
be correlated is if a Science City “attracts” or otherwise encourages the location of more
innovative or better performing firms in their proximities. Still, we make no attempts to
correct for this possible instance of endogeneity. Our interest, in fact, is about evaluating
in a descriptive sense whether any relationship between Science Cities and firm-level
outcomes extends in space, and we do not intend to remove a potential mechanism by
which such relationships may manifest themselves.
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6 Empirical Results at theMunicipal Level
In this section we illustrate the results of the municipal-level empirical analysis. After
describing our matched sample we present our main results. Subsequently, in order to
shed more light on the mechanism driving these results, we discuss estimates restricted
to the non-Naukogrady subsample, as well as results about additional outcomes, such
as municipal budget variables and demographic variables split by cohort of birth.
6.1 Quality of Matching
Our main matching sample is constituted by 85 municipalities that include a Science
City, as well as by 65 matched municipalities which do not host any Science City. Figure
3 displays the matched pairs on the map of Russia. Out of 88 Science City municipalities
in our original data, 3 are not matched to any control observation. On the other hand,
most controls observations are matched to at most two Science Cities (three in a couple
of cases). As we expect from Mahalanobis matching when including municipal coordi-
nates among the covariates, Science Cities and their counterparts are matched – with
a few exceptions – relatively close in space, especially in the more densely populated
and more developed areas of Russia. In particular, municipalities close to Moscow are
typically matched to other municipalities that are also close to Moscow, which mitigates
concerns about the proximity of many Science Cities to the capital of Russia.
Table 5 displays the standardized mean difference and the variance ratio between
treated and control observations, both in the original and in the matched samples. The
table shows that matching achieves a remarkable degree of balance in both the first and
the second moment, despite the rigidity of the Mahalanobis algorithm and the other
requirements that we have imposed on matching (in particular, closed Science Cities
are matched to non-Science closed cities, and vice versa). In order to perform estimates
for outcomes that are missing for some municipalities, or when modern Naukogrady are
excluded from the analysis, we construct matching samples based on a subset of Science
Cities; these samples are characterized by a similarly good degree of covariate balance.
6.2 ATT Estimation: All Science Cities
The main estimates of the ATT for our twelve outcomes of interest are reported in Table
6. In what follows we summarize our results, starting from the demographics variables
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extracted from the 2010 Russian Census. Science Cities seem to be, on average, slightly
more populated than their matched counterparts, by about 24,000 people. This differ-
ence, however, is only weakly statistically significant (at the 10% confidence level), and
it is driven for the most part by the more educated segments of the population. In fact,
the share of inhabitants holding a university degree is higher by about 5.5 percentage
points in Science Cities; similarly, Science Cities still host today more people with some
postgraduate qualification (by 0.2 percentage points). Both differences are statistically
significant at the 1% level. Note that all estimates about these demographic variables
are substantially smaller than the naive differences.
We now turn our attention to innovation measures. Our absolute fractional patents
measure is estimated positive and statistically significant (at the 1% level), similarly as
the corresponding average measure (significant at the 5% level). These results indicate
that between 2006 and 2015, Science Cities have applied to the EPO, on average, for 11
more fractional patents than their matched municipalities, or about 0.7 more fractional
patents for each individual with a postgraduate degree.26 Note that our ATT estimates
are virtually identical to the raw differences for both patent measures, which is arguably
due to the fact that R&D is very spatially concentrated, in Russia as in other countries.
Indeed, by analyzing ROSSTAT data it appears that high-tech sectors of the economy are
more developed in Science Cities, since both measures of employment and salaries in
the combined R&D-ICT sectors register positive and statistically significant differences.
In those industries, Science Cities provide jobs for about 2,300 more people, paying a
monthly salary higher by about 8,000 roubles (roughly $250) at the 2010 prices.
We finally examine our proxies of overall economic activity. Night lights indicators
measured around 2010 register a high and statistically significant difference in favor of
Science Cities (while the raw difference is about threefold). ROSSTAT’s SME Census pro-
vides a different kind of information. While raw differences suggest that Science Cities
are characterized by a overall higher diffusion of SMEs, the corresponding ATT estimates
– either relative to all sectors of the economy, or specific to manufacturing – are not
statistically different from zero. Similar results, which are not displayed in Table 6 for
brevity, are obtained for measures of SME density, (number of SMEs by municipal pop-
ulation). The ATT on the labor productivity of SMEs is, however, estimated positive and
statistically significant, both when pooling all industries and when specifically analyzing
manufacturing (in both cases, ATT estimates are about one half of the naive differences).
26We obtain similar results if we use absolute, as opposed to fractional, measures of patent output.
23
In an anticipation of our later discussion, we argue that the results seem to point to an
economic effect of Science Cities that operates on the intensive (productivity) margin.
We also perform a sensitivity analysis of our ATT estimates, following Rosenbaum
(2002). Specifically, we simulate the presence of some unobserved factors that would
affect both the outcomes and the probability of receiving the treatment, and we assess
to what extent this would influence our conclusions about the presence of statistically
significant differences in Ycq between treated and (matched) control observations, for
all outcomes q = 1, . . . ,Q. The size of the simulated unobserved factor is given by pa-
rameter Γ≥ 1, which measures the hypothesized odds of receiving the treatment (Γ= 1
in an experimental setting). In Table 6 we report, for each outcome variable, the lower
value Γ∗ that leads to inconclusive tests about the presence of a statistically significant
difference between treated and control observations.27 The values of Γ∗ are very high
(around 3) for the census variables, our patent outcomes, the employment and salary
measures in R&D and ICT, as well as the night lights measure. They are satisfactorily
high (around 2) for the measures of SME labor productivity; as expected, they are close
to 1 for the SME count measures.28 These results are in line with our statistical infer-
ence about the estimated ATT parameters, and show that our qualitative results are very
robust to possible threats to identification.29
We interpret our results in light of our analytical framework presented in Section 3. In
the model, high-skilled population and employment in high-tech sectors can be driven
by some mechanism of long run persistence which traces its roots in the Soviet-era allo-
cation of workers across different cities. For example, high-skilled workers might simply
prefer to live in Science Cities because they consider them their home, because moving
is costly, or because Science Cities are inherently preferable. Agglomeration forces such
as localized knowledge spillovers can reinforce and complement such factors. However,
productivity and wages can only be higher in Science Cities because of agglomeration
forces, or due to some other exogenous factors that are unaccounted by the model. Since
27We set a 5% type l error. More specific results of the sensitivity analysis are available upon request.
28To give context, Γ= 2 indicates a simulated unobserved factor that doubles the probability of receiving
the treatment relative to that of not receiving it, or vice versa; such a high value of Γwould be realistic only
in presence of very serious threats to our conditional independence assumption. Consequently, very high
“critical” values of Γ∗ associated with a certain outcome – close to 2 or higher – indicate that the results
are likely to be very robust to such threats.
29At a first glance, it may seem counterintuitive that Γ∗ > 1 in the case of outcomes, such SME count
measures, whose ATT is estimated not statistically different from zero. However, the latter is a conclusion
derived from a parametric test, while the sensitivity analysis is based on non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-
rank tests. In practice, it is unlikely that the two procedures lead to very divergent conclusions.
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we trace the differential evolution, over 20 years following the dissolution of the USSR,
of a number of pairs of matched cities that varies between 63 and 83, we are not inclined
to believe that exogenous shocks alone can drive the results that we observe for average
patent production, wages in high-tech sectors, and SME labor productivity. Conversely,
we interpret this evidence as favorable to the existence of increasing returns to the co-
location of high-skilled workers (θh > 0), which possibly spills over lesser skilled ones as
well (θ` > 0) as hinted in particular by the results about SME labor productivity.
Finally, it must be mentioned that while our results are based on one-to-one match-
ing, the main qualitative conclusions are not altered in the case of one-to-many match-
ing. In fact, increasing the number of matched nearest neighbors usually increases bias
in exchange for a reduction in variance, and thus may result in a higher number of ATT
parameters being estimated statistically significant (possibly incorrectly). We have ob-
tained similar results by increasing the number of nearest neighbors up to five; however,
we do not present these results here due to space limitations.
6.3 ATT Estimation: Historical Science Cities
Our interpretation of the estimated long run consequences of Science Cities, which rests
on the interaction between persistence and agglomeration forces, would be threatened
if, on average, Science Cities still receive today a differential treatment from the Russian
government, in the form of direct or indirect support to local R&D or other economic
activities. Within our analytical framework, this is isomorphic to the case where the ran-
dom shocks x˜h , and possibly x˜`, have a nonzero mean. In order to assess, to a first degree
of approximation, to what extent our results depend on current governmental support,
we perform an additional analysis which is largely similar to the one discussed above,
with the exception that it excludes those Science Cities with the official status of Nauko-
grady in today’s Russia. For these fourteen Science Cities, the Russian government has
resumed the Soviet-era program in recent years, although with a less military and more
civil focus. By contrast, we call the remaining Science Cities “historical.”
For brevity, we jump directly to the empirical estimates reported in Table 7, which
are also based on one-to-one Mahalanobis matching, and we compare them to those
from Table 6. We find the results striking. In fact, the estimated ATT is, for most out-
comes of interest, very similar to the corresponding estimates from Table 6, if usually
slightly smaller. Statistical inferences and sensitivity analyses à la Rosenbaum generally
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confirm our former assessment.30 The only outcomes for which the removal of Nauko-
grady results in a substantial change of the estimated effects are the patent outcomes.
In the case of the fractional patent count, the estimated ATT is about one half the former
estimates; as for the average fractional patent measure, it is about 70% smaller. Never-
theless, the estimates for both outcomes remain significant at the 1% level and robust, as
evidenced by a Γ∗ well above 2. Notably, the employment and salary measures relative
to the R&D and ICT sector remain very similar to the previous ones.
Our reading of the restricted analysis is as follows. The smaller estimated effects on
the patent outcomes can be explained in two non exclusive ways. On the one hand, in
an institutional context such as that of Russia innovation is still predominantly driven by
the government sector, and our patent measures reflect the importance of renewed state
support to R&D in selected localities. On the other hand, it is possible that in resuming
a restricted version of the older Science Cities program, the Russian government has
chosen the best former Science Cities in order to make them the newer Naukogrady. In
either case, we keep observing a positive differential in favor of historical Science Cities
for most demographic and economic outcomes of interest. Such differentials are even
more surprising as they are clearly independent of the extent to which the government
supports local R&D today, and thus can only interpreted as long run effects of some sort.
Therefore, we find that our previous interpretation of the empirical results is if anything
reinforced from this restricted analysis.
6.4 ATT Estimation: Municipal Budgets
We now turn our attention to the analysis of municipal budget of Science Cities; specif-
ically, we compare certain aggregate entries of the budget of Science Cities to those of
their matched counterparts. The objective of this analysis is twofold. First, this lets us
test the extent to which Science Cities, be they historical or current Naukogrady, receive
a differential amount of direct governmental transfers. In addition, we see this as an op-
portunity to uncover potential drivers of our results. In the analysis of subsidized border
West German municipalities by von Ehrlich and Seidel (2015) that we mentioned in the
introduction, the authors explain their results not by agglomeration forces, but through
the persistence of municipal spending in certain, presumably productivity-enhancing,
30In the case of labor productivity for manufacturing SMEs, the ATT is estimated statistically significant
at the 1% level, but Rosenbaum’s Γ∗ = 1.20 raises a warning sign. In fact, the estimated ATT effect is largely
driven by a subset of matched pairs with large differences for the outcome in question.
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infrastructures. A parallel mechanism could be at work in our setting: for example, since
Science Cities used to be inhabited by relatively more university graduates than other
similar localities, their population might have kept a stronger preference for the provi-
sion of certain public goods, such as those related to education.
Russian municipalities collect resources from both local taxes (property taxes, mer-
chant fees, fees for the provision of local services) and from a portion of federal taxes
(income tax, business tax etc.) that are paid by local residents. In addition, municipal-
ities receive discretional transfers from both the federal and the regional governments.
In our data we are able to identify the source of municipal revenues, as well as the allo-
cation of expenditures by category (education, health services, local infrastructures etc.)
for all Russian municipalities except closed cities. In order to obtain relevant measures
of interest for each municipality, we collapse certain budget items by taking, for each,
the municipal average over the 2006-2016 period (normalized to 2010 prices), and then
we divide the result by the 2010 municipal population. We estimate the ATT of Science
City status on each of these per capita measures, comparing the fiscal and expenditure
patterns of Science Cities to those of their matched counterparts.
Our estimates are summarized in Table 8 for both the sample of non-closed Science
cities, and the one additionally restricted to historical Science Cities. The results are par-
ticularly transparent in the latter case, which we discuss first. In raw differences Science
Cities collect, per capita, more taxes than ordinary municipalities; however, they receive
disproportionately less total transfers: as a result, both their total revenues and expendi-
tures per capita are smaller. When controlling for historically observable characteristics,
however, it appears that total revenues and expenditures per capita are equalized. Since
Science Cities are able to obtain a statistically significant higher amount of tax revenues
per capita with respect to matched localities (as they are richer), this is compensated by
less, and statistically significantly so, total transfers per capita. The case of all non-closed
Science Cities, including today’s Naukogrady, is similar. However, all ATT estimates are
slightly larger in the wider group, indicating that tax revenues, total transfers and total
expenditures per capita are all relatively higher for modern Naukogrady.
Our reading of these results, based on our understanding of the institutional context,
is that political forces operate for the redistribution of federal resources so to achieve ap-
proximately similar levels of governmental expenditures per capita across space. Since
Science Cities are typically richer, this results in less total transfers in their favor. While
we understand that support to Science Cities may also exist in the form of direct expen-
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ditures appearing only in the federal budget – a kind of information which is unfortu-
nately unavailable to us – if historical Science Cities were still of some strategic impor-
tance for the federal government we would expect, if anything, to observe less symmetry
between revenues and tranfers per capita. In other words, the government may want to
complement direct intervention with more indirect subsidies. However, we can only at-
test limited evidence for such a mechanism in the case of today’s Naukogrady, which is
to be expected if the role of historical Science Cities is, in fact, by all means exhausted.
Finally, we investigate the possible presence of differential expenditure patterns of
Science Cities. In particular, we suspected that a more educated population might have
demanded stronger investment in education, which in turn could have represented an
additional channel through which our main results manifest themselves. However, the
estimates about the per capita expenditures in education that are reported in Table 8 do
not support this hypothesis; we find no statistically significant differences across other
expenditures categories either (we do not show the associated estimates for brevity). To
summarize, our analysis of the municipal budgets does not provide evidence in favor of
fiscal channels, either in the form of superior governmental transfers or in that of differ-
ential expenditure patterns à la von Ehrlich and Seidel, to explain our results. In light of
this, we maintain that the mechanisms outlined in our model – the interplay between
persistence and agglomeration forces – constitute a preferable set of explanations.
6.5 ATT Estimation: Demographic and Economic Dynamics
One final concern about the mechanisms that we postulate for interpreting our results
is that they may not be long lasting. Observe that our model analyzes the spatial equilib-
rium that would emerge in a static context if workers initially allocated across space by a
central planner were suddenly allowed to move. In the real world, however, workers are
slowly replaced by younger workers from newer generations. In our framework, the per-
sistence forces interacting with spillover effects are modeled as differential preferences
between static sets of workers. If new generations do not share the preferences or the
characteristics of their fathers, spatial equilibrium can lead over time to mean reversion
– even in presence of agglomeration forces, thanks to the action of random shocks. This
feature is typical of empirical studies in economic geography, perhaps most famously
that by Davis and Weinstein (2002). In this case our results are not to be interpreted as
true long run effects, but rather as snapshots of a long transition back to steady state.
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We investigate the possibility that the advantage of Science Cities wanes over time by
exploiting some additional information present in our dataset. Specifically, our Russian
Census data allows to identify the number of residents in each municipality by type of
attained education within each cohort of birth. This lets us assess to what extent our
results about urban educational levels are mainly driven by older cohorts, or instead
substantially depend from younger cohorts as well. To this end, we split the population
of each municipality between the “young” (those born after 1965), and the “old” (those
born on or before 1965). At the time of the dissolution of the USSR (1991-1992) the older
individuals in the “young” group who had obtained a university degree were starting
their professional career, and presumably could move more easily. Furthermore, those
who were underage at the time of the transition might have pursued less education than
their fathers (mean reversion). Both factors would predict a more equal distribution of
young graduates between Science Cities and their matched counterparts.
We estimate the ATT of Science Cities on the graduate share of the population sepa-
rately for the “old” and “young” groups, by exploiting our matched sample. The results
are reported in Table 9: we find that while the differences are indeed larger for the older
group, they are positive and statistically significant for the younger one, in whose case
the effect amounts to about 60% of the old group’s. All estimates are uniformly smaller,
but still statistically significant, if current Naukogrady are removed from the sample. We
perform a similar analysis for the postgraduate share; however, in this case we define the
threshold year of birth as 1955, taking into account the fact that in Russia, postgraduate
education is characterized by a long average duration.31 In relative terms, the estimates
of the two groups compare similarly to those of the graduate share. For neither measure
the results depend substantively on the chosen threshold. Thus, this analysis provides
little evidence in favor of the mean reversion hypothesis: it appears that the children of
Soviet inhabitants of Science Cities pursue educational and locational choices that are
largely similar to those of their fathers, albeit not identical.
Following this analysis, a logical next step would be to assess mean reversion in eco-
nomic outcomes. If the relative skill level of Science Cities and that of comparable mu-
nicipalities are equalized over time, we would expect economic convergence as well.
31We observe a secular increase in the attainment of postgraduate education in Russia following the
transition, which is opposite to the general trend observed for tertiary education. Among all municipali-
ties, the unweighted average share of graduates in the old group is about 12.5%, while it amounts to about
11.0 among the younger (24.5% vs. 21.5% in Science Cities). Conversely, the postgraduate share is 0.15%
in the old group and 0.33% in the young group (0.50% vs. 0.63% in Science Cities).
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Unfortunately, our data do not let us track the evolution of our proxies of economic
activity over time, except for one variable: our night lights satellite data. Table 9 also
displays the ATT estimates for the average night lights measurements obtained between
1992 and 1994, right after the transition. We ensure comparability with the estimates re-
ported in Tables 6-7 for the 2009-2011 average, by appropriately normalizing both into
z-scores. By examining both, one can observe that the estimates relative to 2009-2011
are actually larger than those for 1992-1994, indicating that, if anything, Science Cities
have been growing faster than their matched municipalities. While this finding may also
be due to the possibility that the negative shock associated with the transition dispro-
portionately affected Science Cities, with a resulting ensuing rebound, it hardly supports
the hypothesis of mean reversion either. Consequently, we maintain our conclusion that
the main results are to be interpreted as persistent long run effects, which have long sur-
vived the original policy that has ultimately caused them.
7 Empirical Results at the Firm Level
In this section we discuss our empirical results at the firm level, which are aimed at ex-
ploring the “spatial reach” of Science Cities and their consequences on firms’ innovation
and performance. We separately present estimates of non-linear models based on (11)
and of linear models like (12), and we briefly comment on their economic significance.
7.1 Estimates of γ: Binary Innovation Outcomes
Table 10 presents the results from the estimation of several probit models with latent
variable representation (11) for five separate firm-level outcome binary outcomes I f r :
whether a firm engages in any R&D activity; whether in the three years prior to the sur-
vey the firm has produced a relevant innovation (either product or process); whether
this was specifically a product, or a process innovation; and finally if the firm’s innova-
tion effort has resulted in a patent. On the right-hand side of (11) we employ different
agglomeration measures, possibly separated for service and manufacturing firms, as we
discuss in Section 5.2. In the table, we present the probit marginal effects, which are in-
terpreted as the increase in the probability of I f r = 1 which is associated with a unitary
increase in Hs for a firm in a “relatively isolated” Science City s. The relative standard
errors are Taylor-linearized to account for survey stratification.
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In what follows, we discuss our results for each agglomeration measure. In the case
of the patent-based measure, the estimates of γ is positive and statistically significant
for three outcome variables: engagement in R&D (1.5% marginal effect), product inno-
vation (1.2%) and patent realization (1.8%). These results seem to be driven by manu-
facturing firms; for service firms, γ is conversely positive and statistically significant for
process innovation (2.9%) and general innovation (3.5%). Observe that in the case of the
patent outcome, interacting γ with the macro-sector categories results in very impre-
cise estimates. In short, these results indicate that the innovativeness of Science Cities
seems to somehow spill over the firms that are located sufficiently close to them. While
these marginal effects cannot be interpreted in a causal sense, they are indicative of
some economic mechanisms that induce firms with more innovation potential to locate
in the proximity of Science Cities. These mechanisms operate more in terms of product
or process innovation whether firms belong to the manufacturing or the services sector.
For the two agglomeration measures based on the graduate and postgraduate share,
the results are qualitatively similar. For the sake of brevity we mainly discuss the former;
note that the marginal effects reported next are those associated with an increase of the
graduate share of cities s by 1 percentage point. The estimates of γ for the manufactur-
ing sector are positive and statistically significant for the R&D outcome (1.6%), product
innovation (1.6%) and the patent outcome (1.9%), but negative and statistically signifi-
cant for process innovation (−2.1%). Because the results take opposite signs for product
and process innovation, the estimate of γ for general innovation is unsurprisingly not
statistically significant. However, no relevant correlations are attested for service firms,
which explains the small precision of the undifferentiated estimates of γ. The results for
the postgraduate share agglomeration measure are very similar to those based on the
graduate share; note that the apparently large marginal effects are easily explained in
light of the smaller empirical support of the postgraduate share variable.
Like the case of the patent-based agglomeration measure, our estimates based on
the relative level of education of those Science Cities that are closer to firms hint at the
presence of spillover effects favoring for the most part the manufacturing sector; how-
ever, we find the negative and statistically significant estimate for process innovation
puzzling. To explain it we hypothesize that manufacturing firms with production tech-
nologies closer to the frontier, which consequently are likely to innovate their processes
more slowly than those in course of catching up, tend to be located on average closer
to Science Cities; the result in question might then be a mechanical artifact of the data.
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Finally, observe that our estimates of γ are very imprecise and often not in line with
the results previously illustrated, when all three agglomeration measures are included
in the estimation (possibly interacted with the macro-sector dummies). This is arguably
a result of the fact that the three measures are quite collinear (see Table 4).
7.2 Estimates of γ˜: Performance Indicators
The measurement of the returns to R&D and innovation corresponds with a traditional
line of research in empirical studies of innovation economics.32 In our setting, we are
similarly interested into uncovering some ultimate performance advantages for firms
that locate close to Science Cities, which can be either due to the indirect effect of firm-
level innovation spurred by Science Cities (which we illustrated above) or to spillovers
of a different kind. To this end, we provide reduced form evidence about the association
between Science Cities and firms’ labor productivity or sales, by estimating model (12)
under different specifications. The results are reported in Table 11; note that for both
labor productivity and sales we utilize two different outcome measures, one from our
BEEPS survey and the other from Orbis’ matched accounting data.33
In the case of the patent-based agglomeration measure, γ˜ is estimated positive and
statistically significant, but only in the case of our BEEPS indicators. By interacting our
main regressor G f r with macro-sector dummies, we can observe that this effect appears
to operate only among service firms. In our running scenario of a firm located right in
the center of a semi-isolated Science City s, one extra fractional patent appears to be
correlated with a 14% increase in total sales, and a 12% increase in labor productivity.
These are large and relevant figures, although in reality few firms in our sample are that
close to Science Cities, and the actual correlation must thus be discounted for distance
decay. When estimating the model employing our agglomeration measure based on the
graduate-share, we obtain statistically significant results only for our Orbis indicators.
Once again, the effects appear to be entirely driven by service firms: if the graduate share
increases by one percentage point in the Science City of our reference firm, operating
revenue goes up by 4.6%, while labor productivity increases by 4.8%. We obtain quali-
tatively similar results when using the postgraduate share measure, and when pooling
all measures together in our estimates (in this case, γ˜ is statistically significant only for
service firms when using BEEPS, not Orbis indicators).
32See e.g. two relevant surveys: Hall, Mairesse and Mohnen (2010) and Syverson (2011).
33Specifically, we employ the measure of operating revenue from Orbis.
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These results raise two questions. First, one may ask why the results on BEEPS and
Orbis indicators do not coincide for each of our agglomeration measures. Clearly, the
latter are imperfect measures of the influence of Science Cities; nevertheless, they out-
line a consistent picture: an association of Science Cities with firm-level performance
indicators does exist, but only for service firms. The second question is about the di-
vergence of these results from those about firm-level innovation, which appear to be
driven by manufacturing firms instead. To address this interrogative, one must consider
the specific context of the Russian transition from a planned to a market economy. In
Soviet times the service sector was virtually non-existent, and it has taken decades for it
to develop in transitioning Russia to a degree comparable to that of western economies.
Manufacturing, on the other hand, underwent a deep restructuring due to the pressure
of international competition. It is thus unsurprising that, under favorable conditions,
service firms are more easily observed to grow, while manufacturing firms exert more
innovative effort. Still, more research – ideally employing longitudinal firm-level data –
appears necessary in order to reconcile these different pieces of evidence.
8 Conclusion
In this article we have analyzed the long-run effects of a unique historical placed-based
policy: the creation of R&D-focused Science Cities in Soviet Russia. Both the initial es-
tablishment and the eventual suspension of this program was largely guided by political
factors that are arguably exogenous to drivers of current social and economic conditions
of Russian cities. We compare Science Cities to other localities that were observation-
ally similar to them at the time of their selection, and we compute differences in the
current characteristics between the two groups. We find that former Science Cities are
bigger today, largely because they host a higher number of well-educated individuals.
Moreover, they produce a higher number of internationally recognized patents (both in
absolute terms and considering the average in the population of potential inventors);
their R&D and ICT sectors are more developed, and pay higher salaries; finally, Science
Cities host more productive small businesses (although not a higher number of them).
Through a separate firm-level analysis, moreover, we attest some evidence in support of
the hypothesis that the effect of Science Cities extends beyond their municipal borders.
Because our results hold largely unchanged after the removal, from the estimation
sample, of Science Cities that today receive resumed support from the Russian govern-
33
ment, we conjecture that they are consequent to the interaction between persistence
and agglomeration forces, which we illustrate within a simple spatial equilibrium frame-
work. Specifically, high-skilled individuals who have remained in their former cities of
residence have contributed to the emergence of more productive businesses in the new
market economy. By analyzing municipal budgets, we rule out alternative explanations
such as differential governmental transfers or provision of public goods. In addition, by
examining our data in more detail we find little support for rapid mean reversion: thus,
we believe that ours is a valuable contribution to the extant literature on place-based
policies, which up to now has found only limited evidence in favor of long-run effects
following the suspension of a program. More generally, our results are also informative
for science and innovation policy, both in the context of emerging economies such as
Russia and in those of traditionally capitalistic countries. We hope that these results will
be invoked to motivate similar R&D policies but with a civil, instead of military, purpose.
References
Abadie, Alberto and Guido W. Imbens (2006) “Large Sample Properties of Matching Es-
timators for Average Treatment Effects,” Econometrica, Vol. 74, No. 1, pp. 235–267.
(2011) “Bias-corrected matching estimators for average treatment effects,” Jour-
nal of Business and Economic Statistics, Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 1–11.
Aguirrechu, Alexander A. (2009) Russian science cities: History of formation and develop-
ment (Naukogradi Rossiyi: Istoriya formirovaniya i razvitiya), Moscow: Moscow Uni-
versity Press. Available in Russian only.
Ambler, John, Denis J. B. Shaw, and Leslie Symons eds. (1985) Soviet and East European
Transport Problems, London: Croom Helm.
Andrienko, Yuri and Sergei Guriev (2004) “Determinants of interregional mobility in
Russia: Evidence from panel data,” Economics of Transition, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 1–27.
Audretsch, David B. and Maryann P. Feldman (1996) “R&D Spillovers and the Geography
of Innovation and Production,” American Economic Review, Vol. 86, No. 3, pp. 630–
640.
34
Beaudry, Catherine and Andrea Schiffauerova (2009) “Who’s right, Marshall or Jacobs?
The localization versus urbanization debate,” Research Policy, Vol. 38, No. 2, pp. 318–
337.
Bircan, Çag˘atay and Ralph De Haas (2017) “The Limits of Lending: Banks and Technol-
ogy Adoption across Russia.” mimeo.
Bloom, Nicholas, Mark Schankerman, and John Van Reenen (2013) “Identifying Tech-
nology Spillovers and Product Market Rivalry,” Econometrica, Vol. 81, No. 4, pp. 1347–
1393.
Boschma, Ron and Koen Frenken (2011) “The emerging empirics of evolutionary eco-
nomic geography,” Journal of Economic Geography, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 295–307.
Breschi, Stefano and Francesco Lissoni (2009) “Mobility of skilled workers and co-
invention networks: an anatomy of localized knowledge flows,” Journal of Economic
Geography, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 439–468.
Bronzini, Raffaello and Guido de Blasio (2006) “Evaluating the impact of investment in-
centives: The case of Italy’s Law 488/1992,” Journal of Urban Economics, Vol. 60, No.
2, pp. 327–349.
Busso, Matias, Jesse Gregory, and Patrick M. Kline (2013) “Assessing the incidence and
efficiency of a prominent place based policy,” American Economic Review, Vol. 103,
No. 2, pp. 897–951.
Central management unit of the military communications of the Red Army (1943)
Schemes of railways and waterways of the USSR (Shemi zheleznih dorog i vodnih putey
soobsheniya SSSR): Military Publishing of the People’s Commisariat of Defence. Avail-
able in Russian only at http://istmat.info/files/uploads/45009/shemy_zhd_
i_vodnyh_putey_sssr_1943.pdf (last accessed on 30 November 2016).
Cheremukhin, Anton, Mikhail Golosov, Sergei Guriev, and Aleh Tsyvinski (2017) “The
Industrialization and Economic Development of Russia through the Lens of a Neo-
classical Growth Model,” Review of Economic Studies. Forthcoming.
Cooper, Julian M. (2012) “Science-technology policy and innovation in the USSR,”
slides, CEELBAS Workshop "Russia’s Skolkovo in Comparative and Historical Perspec-
35
tive", held on 12 June 2012 at UCL SSEES. Available at http://www.ceelbas.ac.uk/
workshops/skolkovo/Cooper (last accessed on 30 November 2016).
Criscuolo, Chiara, Ralf Martin, Henry Overman, and John Van Reenen (2012) “The
Causal Effects of an Industrial Policy,” NBER Working Paper 17842, National Bureau
of Economic Research.
Davis, Donald R. and David E. Weinstein (2002) “Bones, Bombs, and Break points: the
Geography of Economic Activity,” American Economic Review, Vol. 92, No. 5, pp. 1269–
1289.
De Witt, Nicholas (1961) Education and professional employment in the U.S.S.R., Wash-
ington, D.C.: National Science Foundation.
Dexter, Keith and Ivan Rodionov (2016) “The Factories, Research and Design Estab-
lishments of the Soviet Defence Industry: a Guide. Version 17,” working paper,
The University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Available at http://www2.
warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/mharrison/vpk/data/ (last accessed
on 29 November 2016).
Donaldson, Dave and Adam Storeygard (2016) “Thew view from above: Applications of
satellite data in economics,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 30, No. 4, pp. 171–
198.
Drucker, Joshua M. (2012) “The Spatial Extent of Agglomeration Economies: Evidence
from Three U.S. Manufacturing Industries,” US Census Bureau Center for Economic
Studies, No. CES-WP-12-01.
Duranton, Gilles and Diego Puga (2004) “Micro-Foundations of Urban Agglomeration
Economies,” in J. Vernon Henderson and Jacques-François Thisse eds. Handbook of
Regional and Urban Economics, Vol. 4: Cities and Geography, Chap. 48, pp. 2063–2117.
von Ehrlich, Maximilian and Tobias Seidel (2015) “The Persistent Effects of Place-Based
Policy: Evidence from the West-German Zonenrandgebiet,” CESifo Working Paper Se-
ries, No. 5373.
Ellison, Glenn, Edward L. Glaeser, and William R. Kerr (2010) “What causes industry ag-
glomeration? Evidence from coagglomeration patterns,” American Economic Review,
Vol. 100, No. 3, pp. 1195–1213.
36
Friebel, Guido and Sergei Guriev (2005) “Attaching workers through in-kind payments:
Theory and evidence from Russia,” World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp.
175–202.
Ganguli, Ina (2014) “Immigration & ideas: What did Russian scientists ’bring’ to the US?”
Working Paper 30, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics.
Givord, Pauline, Rolande Rathelot, and Patrick Sillard (2013) “Place-based tax exemp-
tions and displacement effects: An evaluation of the Zones Franches Urbaines pro-
gram,” Regional Science and Urban Economics, Vol. 43, No. 1, pp. 151–163.
Glaeser, Edward L., Hedi D. Kallal, José A. Scheinkman, and Andrei Schleifer (1992)
“Growth in Cities,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 100, No. 6, pp. 1126–1152.
Glaeser, Edward L. and Joshua D. Gottlieb (2008) “The economics of place-making poli-
cies,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, pp. 155–239, Spring.
(2009) “The Wealth of Cities: Agglomeration Economies and Spatial Equilibrium
in the United States,” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 74, No. 4, pp. 983–1028.
Gokhberg, Leonid (1997) “Transformation of the Soviet R&D System,” in Leonid
Gokhberg, Merton J. Peck, and János Gács eds. Russian Applied Research and Devel-
opment: Its Problems and its Promise, Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute for
Applied Systems Analysis, pp. 9–33. Available at http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/5156/
1/RR-97-007.pdf.
Greenstone, Michael, Richard Hornbeck, and Enrico Moretti (2010) “Identifying agglom-
eration spillovers: Evidence from winners and losers of large plant openings,” Journal
of Political Economy, Vol. 118, No. 3, pp. 536–598.
Gu, Xing Sam and Paul R. Rosenbaum (1993) “Comparison of Multivariate Match-
ing Methods: Structures, Distances, and Algorithms,” Journal of Computational and
Graphical Statistics, Vol. 2, No. 4, pp. 405–420.
Hall, Bronwyn H., Jacques Mairesse, and Pierre Mohnen (2010) “Measuring the Returns
to R&D,” in B. H. Hall and N. Rosenberg eds. Handbook of the Economics of Innovation:
Elsevier.
37
Hodler, Roland and Paul A. Raschky (2014) “Regional favoritism,” The Quarterly Journal
of Economics, Vol. 129, No. 2, pp. 995–1033.
Ivanov, Denis S. (2016) “Human Capital and Knowledge-Intensive Industries Location:
Evidence from Soviet Legacy in Russia,” Journal of Economic History, Vol. 76, No. 3,
pp. 736–768.
Jaffe, Adam B. (1989) “Real Effects of Academic Research,” American Economic Review,
Vol. 79, No. 5, pp. 957–970.
Jaffe, Adam B., Manual Trajtenberg, and Rebecca Henderson (1993) “Geographic local-
ization of knowledge spillovers as evidenced by patent citations,” The Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics, Vol. 108, No. 3, pp. 577–598.
Kline, Patrick M. and Enrico Moretti (2014a) “Local Economic Development, Agglomer-
ation Economies, and the Big Push: 100 Years of Evidence from the Tennessee Valley
Authority,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 121, No. 1, pp. 275–331.
(2014b) “People, Places, and Public Policy: Some Simple Welfare Economics of
Local Economic Development Programs,” Annual Review of Economics, Vol. 6, pp.
629–662.
Lappo, G. M. and P. M. Polyan (2008) “Naukograds of Russia: Yesterday’s forbidden and
semi-forbidden cities - today’s growth points (Naukogrady Rossii: Vcherashniye za-
pretnyye i poluzapretnyye goroda - segodnyashniye tochki rosta),” World of Russia
(Mir Rossiyi), No. 1, pp. 20–49. Available in Russian only.
Lychagin, Sergey, Joris Pinkse, Margaret E. Slade, and John Van Reenen (2016) “Spillovers
in space: Does geography matter?” Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 64, No. 2, pp.
295–335.
Marshall, Alfred (1890) Principles of economics, London: Macmillan, 8th edition.
Mikhailova, Tatiana (2012) “Where Russians Should Live: a Counterfactual Alternative
to Soviet Location Policy,” in MPRA Paper 35938: University Library of Munich, Ger-
many.
Moretti, Enrico (2004) “Workers’ education, spillovers and productivity: Evidence from
plant-level production functions,” American Economic Review, Vol. 94, No. 3, pp. 656–
690.
38
(2011) “Local Labor Markets,” in Handbook of Labor Economics: Elsevier.
(2013) “Real Wage Inequality,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics,
Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 65–103.
Moretti, Enrico, Claudia Steinwender, and John Van Reenen (2016) “The Intellectual
Spoils of War? Defense R&D, Productivity and Spillovers.” mimeo.
NAS (2002) Successes and difficulties of small innovative firms in Russian nuclear cities:
Proceedings of a Russian-American workshop. Committee on Small Innovative Firms
in Russian Nuclear Cities, Office for Central Europe and Eurasia Development, Se-
curity, and Cooperation, National Research Council, in cooperation with the Insti-
tute of Physics and Power Engineering, Obninsk, Russia, Washington, D.C.: National
Academy of Sciences. Available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/10392.html (last
accessed on 29 September 2016).
Neumark, David and Jed Kolko (2010) “Do enterprise zones create jobs? Evidence from
California’s Enterprise Zone Program,” Journal of Urban Economics, Vol. 68, No. 1, pp.
1–19.
Neumark, David and Helen Simpson (2014) “Place-Based Policies,” NBER Working Paper
20049, National Bureau of Economic Research.
OECD and Statistical Office of the European Communities (2005) Oslo Manual: Guide-
lines for Collecting and Interpreting Innovation Data, 3rd Edition, The measurement
of Scientific and Technological Activities, Luxembourg: OECD Publishing, pp.162.
Roback, Jennifer (1982) “Wages, Rents and the Quality of Life,” Journal of Political Econ-
omy, Vol. 90, No. 6, pp. 1257–1278.
Rosen, Sherwin (1979) “Wage-based Indexes of Urban Quality of Life,” in P. N.
Miezkowski and M. R. Straszheim eds. Current Issues in Urban Economics: Johns Hop-
kins University Press, Baltimore, MD.
Rosenbaum, Paul R. (2002) Design of Observational Studies: Springer.
Ruchnov, K. M. and E. G. Zaitseva (2011) Crisis of Russian science cities (Krizis
naukogradov Rossiyi). Available in Russian only at http://www.mosveo.ru/images/
stories/00008.doc (last accessed on 20 March 2013).
39
Saltykov, Boris G. (1997) “The reform of Russian science,” Nature, Vol. 388, No. 6637, pp.
16–18.
Storeygard, Adam (2016) “Farther on down the road: Transport costs, trade and urban
growth in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 83, No. 3, pp. 1263–
1295.
Syverson, Chad (2011) “What Determines Productivity?” Journal of Economic Literature,
Vol. 49, No. 2, pp. 326–365.
Thompson, Peter and Melanie Fox-Kean (2005) “Patent Citations and the Geography of
Knowledge Spillovers: A Reassessment,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 95, No.
1, pp. 450–460.
Vernadsky State Geological Museum and U.S. Geological Survey, 20010600 (2001)
“rails.shp. Railroads of the Former Soviet Union,” U.S. Geological Survey, Denver,
CO. Available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2001/ofr-01-104/fsucoal/html/
data1.htm\#rail (last accessed on 29 November 2016).
Wang, Jin (2013) “The economic impact of Special Economic Zones: Evidence from Chi-
nese municipalities,” Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 101, No. 2, pp. 133–147,
March.
Zhao, Zhong (2004) “Using Matching to Estimate Treatment Effects: Data Requirements,
Matching Metrics, and Monte Carlo Evidence,” The Review of Economics and Statistics,
Vol. 86, No. 1, pp. 91–107.
40
Figures
Figure 1: Location of science cities and regional population density
Source: Table A.1 (Data Appendices) and ROSSTAT.
Figure 2: Location of science cities and regions covered in BEEPS V Russia
Source: Table A.1 and BEEPS V Russia.
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Figure 3: Science Cities and their matches
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Tables
Table 1: Municipal-level data: Descriptive statistics
Science Cities Other Municipalities
Obs. Mean (SE) Obs. Mean (SE) p-value
Latitude 88 55.664 2250 53.981 0.000
(0.391) (0.108)
Longitude 88 49.771 2250 59.955 0.000
(2.387) (0.620)
January mean °C 88 -11.632 2250 -13.559 0.000
(0.410) (0.149)
July mean °C 88 18.535 2250 18.755 0.247
(0.181) (0.056)
Average altitude 88 0.169 2250 0.267 0.000
(0.010) (0.007)
Minimum distance from railroad 88 0.007 2250 0.078 0.000
(0.001) (0.005)
Minimum distance from river 88 0.032 2250 0.056 0.000
(0.004) (0.001)
Minimum distance from lake 88 0.118 2250 0.172 0.000
(0.009) (0.003)
Minimum distance from coast 88 0.725 2250 0.730 0.917
(0.044) (0.010)
Minimum distance from USSR border 88 0.665 2250 0.679 0.723
(0.037) (0.009)
Population in 1959 88 67.583 2250 49.573 0.167
(12.516) (3.242)
Number of universities in 1959 88 0.557 2250 0.196 0.132
(0.224) (0.046)
Number of State Bank branches 88 1.096 2250 0.739 0.000
(0.987) (0.977)
Number of plants in 1947 88 6.205 2250 2.484 0.023
(1.458) (0.697)
Number of R&D institutes in 1959 88 0.807 2250 0.412 0.242
(0.253) (0.222)
Area in km2 88 0.692 2250 7.108 0.000
(0.116) (0.637)
Population in 2010 88 131.557 2250 58.324 0.001
(21.169) (5.871)
Graduate share in 2010 88 0.225 2250 0.110 0.000
(0.008) (0.001)
Postgraduate share in 2010 88 0.006 2250 0.003 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Fractional Patents, 2006-2015 88 13.909 2250 2.265 0.002
(3.489) (1.210)
Avg. Fractional Patents, 2006-2015 88 0.761 2.265 0.028 0.000
(2.944) (0.107)
Night lights, 2009-2011 88 30.611 2250 7.638 0.000
(2.124) (0.272)
Avg. Salary in R&D and ICT in 2010 (thousands) 73 24.265 2177 15.368 0.000
(10.001) (7.978)
Employment in R&D and ICT in 2010 (thousands) 73 4.260 2177 1.004 0.026
(6.937) (12.394)
Number of SMEs in 2010 (thousands, all) 69 3239.725 2140 1189.833 0.008
(742.669) (67.367)
SME labor productivity (all) 69 1643.995 2153 794.105 0.000
(84.513) (9.213)
Number of SMEs in 2010 (thousands, manufacturing) 69 395.073 2038 119.546 0.010
(103.133) (7.535)
SME labor productivity (manufacturing) 67 1438.443 2014 768.462 0.000
(84.554) (20.805)
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Table 2: Firm-level data: Descriptive statistics
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Young firms (0-5 years) 4220 0.297 0.457 0 1
50% or more foreign owned 4220 0.026 0.158 0 1
50% or more state owned 4220 0.012 0.108 0 1
Direct exporter 4220 0.100 0.300 0 1
Main market: local 4220 0.697 0.460 0 1
Main market: national 4220 0.288 0.453 0 1
% of employees with a completed university degree 4045 52.505 30.521 0 100
Manufacturing 4220 0.325 0.469 0 1
Located in a city with population over 1 million 4220 0.255 0.436 0 1
Minimum distance of a firm from a Science City (in km) 4220 154.410 237.742 0.198 1358.035
Exponential 1 decay distance of a firm from a Science City 4220 0.012 0.067 0.000 0.822
Log (number of employees), Orbis 2979 3.750 0.860 0.693 8.860
Log (capital), Orbis 3027 5.603 2.089 -2.659 12.916
Log (materials), Orbis 2936 6.212 1.964 -3.912 12.839
Log (operating revenue), Orbis 2980 6.442 1.862 -1.966 13.036
Total factor productivity 2979 0.079 1.356 -8.194 6.544
Log labor productivity, Orbis 2979 2.690 1.343 -5.577 9.167
R&D (dummy) 4220 0.111 0.314 0 1
Technological innovation (dummy) 4220 0.216 0.411 0 1
Product innovation (dummy) 4220 0.129 0.335 0 1
Process innovation (dummy) 4220 0.141 0.348 0 1
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Table 3: Agglomeration Variable: Descriptives
λ= 1 λ= 2 λ= 5
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Overall
Patenting 0.044875 0.564278 0.012969 0.245913 0.008035 0.177558
Higher education 0.000621 0.006970 0.000231 0.003545 0.000154 0.002620
Postgraduate education 0.000018 0.000227 0.000007 0.000116 0.000004 0.000085
Manufacturing
Patenting 0.016345 0.392833 0.005485 0.198346 0.003667 0.149822
Higher education 0.000256 0.004811 0.000108 0.002680 0.000076 0.002052
Postgraduate education 0.000007 0.000141 0.000003 0.000078 0.000002 0.000059
Services
Patenting 0.028530 0.406232 0.007484 0.145651 0.004367 0.095458
Higher education 0.000364 0.005062 0.000124 0.002327 0.000078 0.001632
Postgraduate education 0.000011 0.000178 0.000004 0.000087 0.000002 0.000062
Table 4: Agglomeration Variables: Correlations
λ= 1 λ= 2 λ= 5
Patenting Higher education Patenting Higher education Patenting Higher education
Patenting 1 1 1
Higher education 0.6423*** 0.6791*** 0.6801***
Postgraduate education 0.5466*** 0.9449*** 0.5589*** 0.9441*** 0.5575*** 0.943***
Table 5: Covariate Balance: Mahalanobis Matching, all Science Cities
Stand. bias Variance ratio
Raw Matched Raw Matched
Latitude 0.3592 0.0292 0.5429 0.9218
Longitude -0.4503 0.0027 0.5346 0.9671
January mean ◦C 0.3916 0.0154 0.2750 1.0869
July mean ◦C -0.0854 0.0418 0.4189 1.0892
Average altitude -0.4050 -0.0214 0.0858 0.9828
(Log) population in 1959 -0.1273 -0.0006 2.1616 0.9714
(Log) area in km2 -1.1775 -0.0581 1.1944 0.8159
(Log) no. of plants in 1947 0.7642 0.0683 2.3061 0.9678
(Log) no. of R&D institutes in 1947 0.7263 0.0523 4.8844 1.1064
(Log) no. of universities in 1959 0.3227 0.0058 3.1266 1.1697
Number of State Bank branches -0.3294 -0.0633 1.0101 1.1924
Dist. from railroad -0.4304 -0.0954 0.0015 0.8418
Dist. from USSR border -0.0359 -0.0483 0.7059 1.0157
Dist. from coastline -0.0537 -0.0172 1.3513 0.9962
Notes: For each variable in the left column, the table reports both the difference in
the variance-standardized mean and the variance ratio between treated and con-
trol observations, for both the raw sample and the matched sample. The matched
sample is obtained through the Mahalanobis matching algorithm applied to the
variables above, forcing exact matching on: closed city status, presence of a lake
or a river in the municipal territory, and direct access to the coast. The number
of plants, universities and R&D institutes is increased by one before applying the
logarithmic transformation. Matching is one-to-one with replacement.
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Table 6: Municipal-level Results: Mahalanobis Matching, all Science Cities
Whole Sample Matched Sample (1 nearest neighbor)









































































Notes: ∗ denotes p < 0.10, ∗∗ denotes p < 0.05, and ∗∗∗ denotes p < 0.01; where p is the p-value associ-
ated to each parameter estimate (standard errors are reported in parentheses). In the matched sample, T
is the number of matched treated observations; C is the number of matched controls; ‘ATT’ and ‘ATT b.a.’
are two estimates of the ATT respectively excluding and including a bias-adjustment term (Abadie and
Imbens, 2011). In both cases, standard errors are computed following Abadie and Imbens (2006). Γ∗ is
the minimum value of parameter Γ≥ 1, selected from a grid spaced by intervals of 0.05 length, such that
in a sensitivity analysis à la Rosenbaum (2002) the set of Wilcoxon signed-rank tests associated with Γ∗ do
not simultaneously reject the null hypothesis that the outcome variable is not different across the treated
and control samples, for tests with α= .05 type I error. A higher value of Γ is associated to a stronger sim-
ulated unobserved factor which affects both the outcome and the probability of receiving the treatment.
Full-fledged results of the sensitivity analysis for specific outcomes are available upon request.
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Table 7: Municipal-level Results: Mahalanobis Matching, Historical Science Cities
Whole Sample Matched Sample (1 nearest neighbor)









































































Notes: ∗ denotes p < 0.10, ∗∗ denotes p < 0.05, and ∗∗∗ denotes p < 0.01; where p is the p-value associ-
ated to each parameter estimate (standard errors are reported in parentheses). In the matched sample, T
is the number of matched treated observations; C is the number of matched controls; ‘ATT’ and ‘ATT b.a.’
are two estimates of the ATT respectively excluding and including a bias-adjustment term (Abadie and
Imbens, 2011). In both cases, standard errors are computed following Abadie and Imbens (2006). Γ∗ is
the minimum value of parameter Γ≥ 1, selected from a grid spaced by intervals of 0.05 length, such that
in a sensitivity analysis à la Rosenbaum (2002) the set of Wilcoxon signed-rank tests associated with Γ∗ do
not simultaneously reject the null hypothesis that the outcome variable is not different across the treated
and control samples, for tests with α= .05 type I error. A higher value of Γ is associated to a stronger sim-
ulated unobserved factor which affects both the outcome and the probability of receiving the treatment.
Full-fledged results of the sensitivity analysis for specific outcomes are available upon request.
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Table 8: Municipal-level Results: Mahalanobis Matching, Municipal Budgets Analysis
Whole Sample Matched Sample (1 nearest neighbor)
Outcome Raw Difference T C ATT ATT b.a. Γ∗ (α= .05)
All Science Cities





























































Notes: ∗ denotes p < 0.10, ∗∗ denotes p < 0.05, and ∗∗∗ denotes p < 0.01; where p is the p-value associ-
ated to each parameter estimate (standard errors are reported in parentheses). In the matched sample, T
is the number of matched treated observations; C is the number of matched controls; ‘ATT’ and ‘ATT b.a.’
are two estimates of the ATT respectively excluding and including a bias-adjustment term (Abadie and
Imbens, 2011). In both cases, standard errors are computed following Abadie and Imbens (2006). Γ∗ is
the minimum value of parameter Γ≥ 1, selected from a grid spaced by intervals of 0.05 length, such that
in a sensitivity analysis à la Rosenbaum (2002) the set of Wilcoxon signed-rank tests associated withΓ∗ do
not simultaneously reject the null hypothesis that the outcome variable is not different across the treated
and control samples, for tests withα= .05 type I error. A higher value of Γ is associated to a stronger sim-
ulated unobserved factor which affects both the outcome and the probability of receiving the treatment.
Full-fledged results of the sensitivity analysis for specific outcomes are available upon request.
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Table 9: Municipal-level Results: Mahalanobis Matching, “Dynamic” Analysis
Whole Sample Matched Sample (1 nearest neighbor)
Outcome Raw Difference T C ATT ATT b.a. Γ∗ (α= .05)
All Science Cities
Graduate Share: born ≤ 1965 0.125*** 83 65 0.071*** 0.064*** 3.80
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
Graduate Share: born > 1965 0.109*** 83 65 0.046*** 0.040*** 2.45
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
Postgraduate Share: born ≤ 1955 0.004*** 83 65 0.003*** 0.003*** 2.90
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)









Graduate Share: born ≤ 1965 0.110*** 69 58 0.049*** 0.047*** 3.05
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
Graduate Share: born > 1965 0.100*** 69 58 0.033*** 0.031*** 1.95
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Postgraduate Share: born ≤ 1955 0.003*** 69 58 0.002*** 0.002*** 2.30
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)








Notes: ∗ denotes p < 0.10, ∗∗ denotes p < 0.05, and ∗∗∗ denotes p < 0.01; where p is the p-value associ-
ated to each parameter estimate (standard errors are reported in parentheses). In the matched sample, T
is the number of matched treated observations; C is the number of matched controls; ‘ATT’ and ‘ATT b.a.’
are two estimates of the ATT respectively excluding and including a bias-adjustment term (Abadie and
Imbens, 2011). In both cases, standard errors are computed following Abadie and Imbens (2006). Γ∗ is
the minimum value of parameter Γ≥ 1, selected from a grid spaced by intervals of 0.05 length, such that
in a sensitivity analysis à la Rosenbaum (2002) the set of Wilcoxon signed-rank tests associated withΓ∗ do
not simultaneously reject the null hypothesis that the outcome variable is not different across the treated
and control samples, for tests withα= .05 type I error. A higher value of Γ is associated to a stronger sim-
ulated unobserved factor which affects both the outcome and the probability of receiving the treatment.
Full-fledged results of the sensitivity analysis for specific outcomes are available upon request.
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Table 10: Firm-level innovation outcomes: probit average marginal effects (λ= 1)
Product Process Technological Has a
Agglomeration potential measure R&D innovation innovation innovation patent
Patenting 0.015*** 0.012** 0.005 0.023 0.018***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.009) (0.016) (0.006)
Patenting 0.018*** 0.014** -0.015 0.011 0.038
* manufacturing (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.026)
Patenting -0.012 0.008 0.029** 0.035** -0.037
* services (0.027) (0.013) (0.011) (0.016) (0.062)
Higher education 0.756 0.698 -0.529 0.519 0.931
(0.493) (0.528) (0.720) (0.783) (0.642)
Higher education 1.599*** 1.315** -2.143** 0.964 1.926**
* manufacturing (0.542) (0.643) (0.899) (0.754) (0.805)
Higher education -0.963 -0.210 0.203 0.150 -3.677
* services (0.964) (1.042) (0.904) (1.270) (4.954)
Postgraduate education 13.499 12.200 -10.478 9.368 18.536
(18.595) (15.758) (22.860) (24.771) (21.692)
Postgraduate education 75.008*** 65.665** -71.526* 45.526 89.147**
* manufacturing (25.546) (32.293) (38.977) (34.129) (40.106)
Postgraduate education -19.784 -19.717 4.273 -0.142 -122.477
* services (25.008) (28.159) (22.892) (33.250) (217.412)
Patenting 0.018** 0.011 0.025 0.030 0.024
(0.007) (0.009) (0.017) (0.020) (0.015)
Higher education -0.215 0.963 -7.043* -2.354 -1.216
(1.659) (2.149) (3.784) (3.270) (2.862)
Postgraduate education -11.507 -35.355 143.479* 32.815 16.247
(46.695) (52.332) (86.155) (79.706) (63.918)
Patenting 0.019* 0.011 -0.001 0.012 0.197
* manufacturing (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.281)
Patenting 0.027 0.076** 0.043*** 0.053*** 0.002
* services (0.016) (0.030) (0.013) (0.017) (0.022)
Higher education -0.649 -5.44 -4.661** -2.633 -41.289
* manufacturing (2.086) (4.175) (2.125) (4.359) (67.281)
Higher education -41.438* 185.765 -4.951 -4.490 -8.261
* services (22.023) (120.767) (3.561) (4.777) (11.919)
Postgraduate education 18.246 268.314 81.411 114.812 903.725
* manufacturing (53.436) (177.391) (57.724) (150.719) (1440.673)
Postgraduate education 946.266* -9429.358 87.413 62.199 140.698
* services (519.478) (6077.819) (88.581) (124.558) (275.909)
Number of observations 4040 4040 4040 4040 1863
Number of strata 1224 1224 1224 1224 896
Notes: Average marginal effects based on probit using survey-weighted observations (using Stata’s svy prefix). Only coefficients on agglomeration
potential measures are reported. Patenting agglomeration potential measure is based on the number of patents applications to EPO in 2006-2015
in municipalities with science cities, by inventor (fractional counting). Higher education and postgraduate education agglomeration potential mea-
sures are based on the percentage of population with higher education and postgraduate education, respectively, in municipalities with science cities
in 2010. All regressions include region and sector fixed effects and control for other firm characteristics: log number of permanent, full-time employ-
ees, % of employees with a completed college degree, and indicators for young firms (up to 5 years old), 25% foreign and state ownership, exporter
status, local and national main markets for the firms’ products, credit constraindness and whether the firm is located in a city with population over 1
million. Linearized Taylor standard errors clustered on strata are reported in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
50
Table 11: Firm-level performance outcomes: OLS (λ= 1)
Operating revenue Labor productivity Sales Labor productivity
Agglomeration potential measure (Orbis) Orbis) (BEEPS) (BEEPS)
Patenting 0.009 0.008 0.062** 0.056**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.030) (0.026)
Patenting 0.001 -0.007 0.010 0.008
* manufacturing (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011)
Patenting 0.022 0.028 0.143* 0.126**
* services (0.025) (0.024) (0.074) (0.052)
Higher education 3.233* 3.267* 0.722 -0.050
(1.736) (1.764) (3.760) (3.077)
Higher education 0.661 0.668 -1.633 -1.848
* manufacturing (0.901) (0.860) (2.452) (2.458)
Higher education 4.637** 4.847** 1.700 0.415
* services (2.127) (2.020) (6.031) (4.856)
Postgraduate education 101.608** 103.101** -12.015 -31.789
(51.006) (51.345) (111.069) (92.718)
Postgraduate education 20.363 22.142 -88.690 -94.091
* manufacturing (20.583) (20.424) (75.625) (75.556)
Postgraduate education 47.301*** 151.741*** 5.156 -20.325
* services (39.129) (36.141) (145.720) (121.578)
Patenting -0.009 -0.009 0.092*** 0.093***
(0.011) (0.014) (0.029) (0.030)
Higher education 0.414 0.312 -3.007 -4.264
(3.533) (3.556) (7.020) (7.001)
Postgraduate education 97.645 102.369 -41.167 -27.543
(127.543) (127.531) (190.713) (191.855)
Patenting -0.002 -0.011 0.050 0.051
* manufacturing (0.009) (0.009) (0.047) (0.048)
Patenting -0.002 0.003 0.165*** 0.159***
* services (0.016) (0.017) (0.062) (0.048)
Higher education -0.117 -0.507 -3.607 -4.052
* manufacturing (3.066) (2.614) (11.677) (11.830)
Higher education -0.111 0.342 8.542 4.423
* services (4.354) (4.362) (11.796) (9.665)
Postgraduate education 24.929 45.430 -78.723 -71.483
* manufacturing (74.722) (64.534) (258.970) (262.890)
Postgraduate education 152.505 139.483 -339.397 -255.775
* services (116.684) (115.726) (287.565) (258.725)
Number of observations 2809 2809 2926 2926
Number of strata 1086 1086 1074 1074
Notes: Simple OLS using survey-weighted observations (using Stata’s svy prefix). Orbis measures are based on firm-level data from Bureau Van Dijk’s Orbis
database, while BEEPS measures are based on firm-level data from BEEPS. Only coefficients on agglomeration potential measures are reported. Patenting
agglomeration potential measure is based on the number of patents applications to EPO in 2006-2015 in municipalities with science cities, by inventor (frac-
tional counting). Higher education and postgraduate education agglomeration potential measures are based on the percentage of population with higher
education and postgraduate education, respectively, in municipalities with science cities in 2010. All regressions include region and sector fixed effects and
control for other firm characteristics: log number of permanent, full-time employees, % of employees with a completed college degree, and indicators for
young firms (up to 5 years old), 25% foreign and state ownership, exporter status, local and national main markets for the firms’ products, credit constraind-
ness and whether the firm is located in a city with population over 1 million. Orbis measures use information on the number of employees, fixed assets and
cost of materials from Orbis; BEEPS measures use information o the number of employees from BEEPS only, as the other measures are not available for non-
manufacturing firms. Linearized Taylor standard errors clustered on strata are reported in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant
at 1%.
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